Does the Withdrawal of Capacity Help?

As industry prices fall, and companies’ fortunes decline with the resultant squeeze on their margins, some companies, especially the leaders, seek to withdraw capacity from the market.  The leading companies expect the capacity withdrawal to do two things: redress the imbalance between capacity and demand; and raise prices to more attractive levels because of this better balance.  In practice, the withdrawal of capacity often fails to achieve either of these objectives.

Whenever a leader in an industry reduces its capacity to force price increases, it must consider how competitors will respond.  In many, if not most, cases low-cost competitors expand their capacity to make up for the withdrawal of capacity by the industry leaders.  The end result often is even more capacity available in a marketplace and the same or lower prices available for the industry leaders.

After several quarters of improving profits, the airline industry is again slipping into hostile market conditions as rising fuel prices reduce margins and force higher prices.  Higher prices limit demand growth.  In response to the margin squeeze these tougher times bring to the industry, the industry leaders are restricting the growth in their capacity and, in some cases, reducing the capacity they offer in the domestic U.S. market.  The problem is that several of the industry followers are not going along.

United Continental Holdings and AMR Corporation’s American Airlines have both posted losses for the most recent quarter.  Both of these industry leaders plan to reduce their domestic capacity as a result.  They will be reducing seats available flying into and out of selected domestic markets. 

The pattern of leaders reducing capacity and followers adding it seems to be holding in the current airline industry.  Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways and Alaska Air Group derive most of their revenues in the domestic U.S. market.  Each of these companies reported profits in the most recent quarter.  This profitability of the three follower airline competitors indicates that their costs are lower than are the costs of the two legacy airlines that have reported losses, United Continental and American Airlines.  Southwest plans to increase its capacity by 5% to 6% in 2011.  JetBlue plans to add 6% to 8% this year, while Alaska Air plans to grow its capacity by 9%. 

The industry followers are able to add capacity in the face of capacity withdrawal by their larger industry-leading competitors because they have these lower costs.  The lower costs enable the follower companies to make a profit while their larger competitors suffer losses.  In the long run, the only way that the industry-leading competitors will be able to stop the expansion of these follower competitors will be to match or beat their lower cost structures

Amazon's Blockbuster Innovation

In 2005, Amazon introduced its Prime Free Shipping program. This yearly subscription program promised free two-day shipping on any purchase the subscriber made from Amazon. Five years later, 13% of Amazon’s 130 million active users are Prime members. More significantly, 20% of the subscribers who purchased products from Amazon in the last twelve months are Prime subscribers. These Prime subscribers purchase two to three times as much as non-Prime subscribers over the course of a year. This Performance innovation removes an impediment to purchasing on Amazon. In fact, it increases the odds greatly that online purchases will be made on Amazon rather than on a competitive site. This has been a blockbuster innovation for Amazon. The innovation holds a special appeal to the larger customers in the market. The Prime subscribers may also offer Amazon an entry into a business that it has longed to gain, for several years, subscription video rentals. It appears that Amazon will introduce a streaming video product for its Prime subscribers. This new product will not cost the Prime subscribers any more than their normal subscription. Netflix’s Watch Instantly service cost about $96 a year so Amazon may have a price advantage on Netflix. Of course, Convenience and Price are only important provided Amazon offers equivalent Function, that is, streaming video content. We don’t know about that yet. Still, Amazon has proven to be an innovative company who can find ways to build a business in non-traditional ways. It continues to grab market share in the retail business.

Whirlpool and Electrolux Blink

The home appliance market has been a difficult place to compete during several periods over the last thirty years. It is tough again today. Sales of large appliances have fallen steadily since 2007. Competition is intensifying with the pressure of the South Korean competitors, LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics, on Whirlpool Corp and Electrolux AB. Whirlpool and Electrolux are suffering from rising costs for steel, copper, plastics and other raw materials. To offset these cost increases, the two companies plan price increases of 8% to 10% in the spring.

The problem: the Koreans aren’t playing ball. The two South Korean firms are pricing aggressively and have been doing so since Thanksgiving 2010.

The South Koreans are formidable competitors. At one time, LG was known as Lucky Goldstar, a seller of low-end, cheaply made, products. Today, it has a much better brand name and sells quality products. Samsung does as well. It is a leader in the large screen TV market. The products that the South Korean companies are pricing aggressively are not the low-end products. They are the mainstream, heart-of-the-market, products.

The domestic U.S. market is slow growing. So is the market in the rest of the world. The North American market is growing 2% to 3% a year. Europe is growing 2% to 4%, while Latin American and Asia grow in the 5% to 10% range. Large appliance companies will have no trouble supplying all the capacity the market needs at these demand growth rates. The industry is likely to have excess capacity for the foreseeable future.

If the two Western competitors institute their price increases without the two South Korean companies in a lock-step march, they will be in a Leader’s Trap. A Leader’s Trap occurs when one or more of the leading companies in an industry hold its prices high in the mistaken belief that customers will stay loyal despite the lower prices of competition. Leader’s Traps rarely end well. Either the Western competitors will lose market share or they will ultimately rescind their price premiums.

These four giant large appliance competitors are peers of one another. The only way to stop the Koreans from discounting against the Western competitors is to have a cost structure that scares them out of the discounts. The discounting competitors have to see that their discounts will only cost them margins because the other peer competitors in the market will match their low prices since they have equally low cost structures.

The Japanese Pay the Price

The figures are in for U.S. auto sales in 2010. The biggest winners in percentage growth were Hyundai, at 24%, and Ford at 20%. Toyota lost .4% and Honda grew a mediocre 7%. The Japanese struggled in 2010.

Earlier we wrote a blog about Ford’s ascendency and Toyota’s problems (see Blog HERE). Toyota is paying the price for failing its customers. Honda appears to be getting painted with the “failure” brush, though I doubt its punishment is deserved.

I am actually using the word “fail” to mean something specific here. A company fails its customers when it is unable or unwilling to do something that at least half of its competitors can, or will, do for customers. Toyota’s troubles with accelerators, floor mats, and so forth, received extensive media coverage. This coverage clearly has had a negative impact on Toyota this year.

Toyota’s struggles illustrate the win and fail dynamic. In our terms, a “win” occurs when a company is able to do something that the majority of its competitors either can not or will not do. Wins account for a good deal of market share growth in a fast-growing market, but are less important in more mature markets. In a more mature Stable market and, especially, in all Hostile markets, failure moves a significant amount of market share.

Here is what this means. The decision to change a supplier is really two decisions. The first is the decision to leave a current supplier and the second is the decision on which new supplier to take on in your relationship. In the average Stable and Hostile marketplace, more market share moves on failure than on wins. This means that before an established customer will change suppliers, its current incumbent supplier must “fail” the relationship in some way. This failure, then, opens up the customer’s relationship to competition among other potential suppliers. Whichever supplier gains this customer’s volume really did so only after the incumbent failed. We call this gain a “weak win.” The “weak win” would not have happened on a straight-up comparison of performance and price of the new supplier versus the old. The gain only happened after the incumbent clearly failed the customer and then opened the relationship to someone new.

Toyota’s failure was largely a failure of Reliability. It clearly lost share. The companies that gained this share from Toyota, Ford and Hyundai among them, enjoyed some degree of a “weak win” in the domestic automobile market. They may have “won” market share as well, but my guess is that most of their share gains from Toyota fell to them from Toyota’s “failure.”

Direct Edge: A Transformer Next Leader Product

A Next Leader competitor is in an extremely fortunate position. A Next Leader is a competitor or product that offers much better than industry standard performance for a low price to a specific subset of industry customers. While offering better benefits to some customers, it may reduce benefits for others. But all Next Leaders offer low prices. The Next Leader can do this because it has a very low cost structure. (See “Video #22: Definition of Next Leaders” on StrategyStreet.com.) Next Leaders do not appear in many industries. When they do appear, they can change an industry, whether the industry is in manufacturing, retail or service. For example, Toys R Us invented the Toy Retailing Category Killer, a Next Leader product. Home Depot has done much the same in hardware retailing. Other Next Leaders include the early Apple personal computer, Intuit personal financial management software, Jiffy Lube in auto services and Domino’s Pizza.

We have studied many Next Leader competitors. Our study has suggested there are two kinds of Next Leaders products: Reformers and Transformers. A Reformer product is a type of Next Leader that reduces the benefits for the user while increasing benefits for the buyer, compared to the industry’s Standard Leader product. Jiffy Lube and Domino’s Pizza would both be Reformer Next Leader competitors. The second type of Next Leader competitor, Transformer products and companies, increase the benefits for the user of the product but offers, at least initially, fewer buyer benefits than the Standard Leader product. Toys R Us and Home Depot are two examples of Transformer Next Leader competitors.

Direct Edge is an example of a Transformer competitor. It offers its customers very fast securities trading on virtually any platform, from computers to smart phones. It is a young electronic stock exchange and it is having a big impact on securities trading. Its first noticeable impact is in market share. As recently as five years ago, the New York Stock Exchange accounted for 70% or more of the trading in the stocks listed on its exchange. Today, the stock exchange handles 36% of those trades. (See “Audio Tip #85: Evaluate the Company's Success in Penetrating each Price Point in the Market” on StrategyStreet.com.) Twelve other public exchanges, several electronic trading platforms and many “dark pools” command the rest of the market share in NYSE listed stocks.

Direct Edge came into existence during 2010. Several brokerage firms and other financial players formed Direct Edge to offer a counter veiling power to the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. Direct Edge now owns 10% of stock trading in the United States.

Direct Edge is not only big and fast-growing, but inexpensive as well. It has ready access to the share trading of its brokerage house and hedge fund owners. It operates many banks of state-of-the-art computers in warehouse-type facilities in New Jersey rather than in more-expensive New York. And, despite its size, it has fewer than one hundred employees.

The evolution of these non-traditional exchanges has resulted in declining trading costs and much faster trading times for all customers. Next Leaders do that.

The Price Can Go to Zero

For many years, the fees charged by investment managers of mutual funds grew ever so slightly, gradually approaching 1.5%. Over the last few years, though, the growth in these management fees has stopped. In fact, it reversed. Last year the average management fee charged for actively managed mutual funds was 1.38%, or 138 basis points, where a basis point is one tenth of one percent. But that average is badly misleading. It’s misleading because it treats all funds, regardless of size, as the same. When you adjust the fees for the size of the funds, you find that the dollar-weighted average for actively managed funds is now below 100 basis points. Three things have caused this reversal in management fees: low returns in the stock market, the growth of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and a price war among the biggest players in the market.

The first two of these factors need little explanation. Over the last ten years, an investment in many bond funds out-performed an investment in diversified equity funds. These low returns have many investors focusing on the costs they incur for the management of their money. These costs include transaction fees for trading securities and management fees for the companies managing mutual funds or exchanged-traded funds. The second factor, the growth of ETFs, is somewhat less obvious, but important. ETFs have garnered a significant share of new money invested in equity funds over the last few years. Companies managing ETFs charge low fees for managing these funds because they have very low costs for shareholder servicing and some other administrative functions associated with investment management. Shrewd mutual fund managers have reduced prices in order to manage the gap in pricing they allow for their managed mutual funds compared to comparable ETFs.

These two causes of the fall in prices for investment management now have a third important factor. This third factor may turn out to be the most important of all. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The industry is seeing its first price wars” on StrategyStreet.com.) As described in other blogs (see blogs HERE and HERE), Vanguard has started, and continued, a price war in the ETF market. For example, iShare’s MSCI Emerging Market’s ETF and Vanguard’s Emerging Market’s ETF compete directly. Vanguard’s fund charges 27 basis points. The iShare’s fund charges 69 basis points. The iShare’s fund entered the market well before the Vanguard fund, and was much larger than the Vanguard fund. However, during 2010, the Vanguard ETF added $18 billion to its fund while iShare’s added about $4 billion. Price matters among peers.

The iShare’s funds are not always market share losers, however. The iShare’s Gold Trust is an ETF that competes with a larger rival, SPDR Gold Trust. Until June of last year, both of these ETFs charged 40 basis points. In June, iShares cut its management fees to 25 basis points. SPDR Gold Trust stayed pat at 40 basis points. Over the next few months, the iShare’s fund gained $875 million in new money, while the SPDR Gold Trust saw a net loss of $1.2 billion of money under management. Price matters among peers.

These management fees can even go to zero. One ETF today has no management fee, zero. It gets its revenues by lending out the securities in its portfolio. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Technology improvements bring falling prices” on StrategyStreet.com.)

Of course, as companies engage in price wars, they advertise their lower prices extensively in order to capture as much market share as possible before their competitors respond. The result: customers are becoming ever more price sensitive about the management fees they pay, simply because the management companies tell them to be more sensitive.

How long will it be until this fee warfare spreads to other smaller types of ETFs? Not very long, as long as price moves share.

A Price Leader Market and Competitor

In StrategyStreet terms, a competitor or product that offers below industry standard performance for a very low price is a Price Leader. Price Leaders contrast with the typical industry leaders who set standards for the industry, called Standard Leaders in our terms. The competitors or products at the higher end of the market are called Performance Leaders.

The Price Leader’s product has fewer benefits than Standard Leader products. Because the Price Leaders are able to save costs, their product prices average 25% to 50% below the Standard Leader’s price. Because their products do offer less than the Standard Leader product, Price Leaders, as a group, have relatively small market shares, usually less than 15% of industry sales. (See the Perspective, “Why Do Leaders Lead?” on StrategyStreet.com.)

We have analyzed several hundred Price Leaders and found that we could group them into two types, Predators and Strippers. Predators offer the user of the product Functions similar to those of the Standard Leader products but less Reliability because they sell brand names that are unknown. They offer the user equivalent benefits but the purchaser fewer benefits. Strippers offer fewer benefits to both the user and the purchaser of the product. The printer ink industry offers good examples of our Price Leader findings. The total printer ink industry has sales of nearly $22 billion a year. Something just below $3 billion of this is owned by Price Leader competitors, who refill or remanufacture ink cartridges. These Price Leaders, as a group, have 13.5% of the total market.

Most of these Price Leader competitors are Strippers. (See the Perspective, “Attention K-Mart Copiers” on StrategyStreet.com.) Customers who buy their products are often dissatisfied. In fact, only about half of the customers who try the Price Leader product are satisfied with it.

One of these Price Leader competitors, Cartridge World, is in the Predator category of Price Leader competitors. Cartridge World is a leader in the cartridge refill and remanufacturing industry. As a general rule, the company prices its laser cartridges at 25% off of the cost of a new brand named cartridge. Its ink jet cartridges come with discounts of 30% compared to a new brand named cartridge. Its Function benefits are the same as the Standard Leader products. It offers less Reliability due to its unknown brand name. But, Cartridge World puts a 100% guarantee on its products and offers relatively high levels of customer service. As a result, the company is experiencing growth rates of 20% per annum, while its competitors grow at a much slower pace.

Microsoft Phone 7 - A Long Row to Hoe

Recently, Microsoft introduced Windows Phone 7 Mobile software. This is all new software that Microsoft hopes will stop its slide in market share. It is going to have tough sledding.

Until this introduction, Microsoft’s market share in the mobile software business was dropping off a cliff. The company was one of the early entrants into the market. In 2004, it owned 22% of the market. By 2009, its share was down to 9%. Today it is about 5%. Microsoft was quickly fading away. But maybe the new software can help.

For a bit of perspective, we have to explain that there are five separate players involved in this marketplace: the operating system developers, the phone manufacturers, the wireless carriers, the software application developers and the ultimate users. Each of these entities are in separate businesses and represent separate competition. Microsoft plays in the market exclusively as an operating system developer. That’s what Windows Phone 7 is. The Google Android system is another stand-alone mobile operating software platform. So has been Hewlett Packard’s Palm mobile operating software. Three other competitors offer their operating software only in combination with their handset hardware. These include Nokia, with the Symbian operating system, Research In Motion’s Blackberry products and Apple’s iPhones.

The market share ranking today among those competitors in total operating software starts with Nokia’s Symbian, followed by Android, then Blackberry and Apple. Each of these has a market share that are multiples of Microsoft’s current share. Microsoft is fifth, followed by Palm and others.

The new Windows Phone 7 software is a wholly new product. It is completely different than the previous Microsoft mobile software. So different, in fact, that none of the thousands of applications written for the previous Microsoft software will work with Windows Phone 7. The company must start from scratch with applications.

Consumers love applications and make many of their buying decisions on the basis of these applications. (See the Perspective, “When to Compete on Features” on StrategyStreet.com.) Today, Apple has about 250,000 applications, followed by Android with about 70,000. The differences between the two are probably much less than these numbers would indicate because most of the popular applications are available on both platforms. You can see this in the marginal purchases. Android garners more of the current new purchases than does Apple. So, for all practical purposes, Apple no longer owns a significant application lead on Android.

Windows Phone 7 faces a real hurdle with applications. In some ways, it offers a few benefits over the Android and Apple operating systems. For example, it works off of “tiles” that enable a user to get information somewhat faster than in the Android and Apple software. It works easily with Microsoft Office software and it enables gamers to connect to online games easily. These are modest innovations at best, and likely to be followed by others quickly. For example, Motorola already produces software for its phones that pretty much duplicates Microsoft’s “tiles.” Apps are the big problem.

If you are an applications developer, Microsoft would likely be far down your list of the companies for whom you would write new application software for a smart phone. Android and Apple would lead the pack. Nokia, Research In Motion and others offer more current customers than Microsoft but pose difficulties for developers. Microsoft would fall below all these firms. Microsoft has to solve this problem quickly.

Application developers are also likely to be leery of Microsoft and its continued presence in the market. Not only has the company lost share, but it introduced a software platform called Kin in the spring of 2010 aimed at young people, between 12 and 20. This product did not stay in the market even two months. So developers are likely to hold fire on their application development for the Windows Phone 7 platform until they are relatively sure that the product will succeed.

Microsoft is backing its Windows Phone 7 introduction with a $100 million advertising program emphasizing the ease with which a user can get to the information most important to the customer. This seems to me to miss the mark. This advertising investment is a Convenience innovation that advises the customer why the Microsoft system is faster and, therefore, better. (See “Video 15: Definition of Convenience” on StrategyStreet.com.) But it seems that most of the smart phone purchases today are the result of other current users’ recommendations and demonstrations. This is a Reliability innovation. These current users are apt to emphasize the Function benefits of their phones rather than the speed of access to information.

Microsoft might have spent this money differently. It is already paying some developers to create applications for its platform. My guess is that their $100 million might have been much better spent paying for applications, where Microsoft is likely to fail on the basis of lack of Functions rather than paying for the Convenience innovation of advertising.

Here We Go Again

The leader of the United Auto Workers is retiring. He is leaving a union under siege. By 2009, UAW membership was about half of the level of 1995. The union has hemorrhaged members as the big three domestic automobile producers have shrunk in market share, lost billions of dollars, and closed plants.

The departing leader of the UAW claims that the industry’s difficulties never rested with the union and its rich contracts. In his view, the crisis that led to the bankruptcies of GM and Chrysler and the near bankruptcy of Ford was strictly the result of an unexpected spike in gas prices and a recession that resulted from the mortgage crisis. He believes that the fault lay not with the union and not with the industry. Following this belief, he is encouraging his successor to begin clawing back the cost-cutting concessions that the union has granted the Detroit big three domestic automobile manufacturers now that these companies are moving toward profitable operations.

The problem is that these concessions did not do enough, at least from the results they seem to have produced. The concessions really got underway in 2003, as the union reduced its wages and benefits and transferred retiree healthcare costs from the automakers to an independent trust. Despite these concessions, union membership fell parabolically from 2003 to 2009, right along with the profits in the big three. In the meantime, German and Asian manufacturers continued to be profitable. These profits included profits in U.S. domestic manufacturing facilities as well. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Some industry leaders have lower returns than the smaller competitors” on StrategyStreet.com.)

The union is heading back to trouble and will take its unionized facilities with them. In an earlier blog (See Blog HERE), we described the hourly cost differences in wage rates between a unionized and non-unionized domestic facility. These cost differences are unsustainable in the longer term. No one can expect that an automobile plant with $73 dollar an hour labor will be profitable enough to compete with another domestic plant producing similar automobiles at $48 an hour. Despite recent troubles, the Asian manufacturers still command a premium price over their big three competitors for their products. So, Toyota and Honda get a higher price and produce with a lower costs. (See “Video #1: The Two Best Consultants in the World” on StrategyStreet.com.) Tell me how GM, Chrysler and Ford can produce an equivalent or better car with these economic conditions. The claw-backs will only make things worse.

A Tale of Colorblindness Lost

The farm equipment industry is well known for the colors on the equipment of its major suppliers. Deere’s equipment is green, Caterpillar’s is yellow, and New Holland sports a blue color. Normally, customers are very loyal to the “colors” in the industry. This year, however, some customers are losing their green colorblindness. This loss of customer loyalty is coming as a result of a difficult trade-off Deere had to make. This loss of colorblindness also illustrates the way market share moves in many markets.

As the economy collapsed, taking the farm equipment industry with it, Deere had to make some tough choices. Its forecast for the industry’s loss of damage called for it to shrink its inventories radically, and it has done that exceedingly well. Its inventories, as a percentage of the last twelve months of sales, are, by far, the lowest among the industry’s largest suppliers. This inventory reduction, in part, came as Deere borrowed a page from Dell’s success in the personal computer market. Deere is attempting to become a build-to-order company in order to keep working capital investments low and manufacturing economies high.

However, a bump in the road has arisen. The market for farm equipment came back stronger than Deere’s forecasts. As a result, customers who order today will not receive their farm equipment in time for their harvest seasons. In fact, equipment will not arrive for a few months after the harvest. So, some erstwhile “true green” loyal customers are migrating to competing suppliers. Caterpillar, New Holland and others are the beneficiaries of this market share movement.

This illustrates one of the two ways that market share moves in a market. (See “Audio Tip #29: Positive vs. Negative Volatility” on StrategyStreet.com.) In one way, which we call a “win”, a supplier in the industry does something that most of the other industry competitors either will nor, or can not do, and wins market share at the expense of its competitors. (See “Audio Tip #34: How Does a Company “Win” in a Market?”) In the second mode of market share movement, which we call a “failure”, a supplier who is an incumbent in a customer relationship either can not, or will not, do something that at least half the other competitors in the market can, and will, do. (See “Audio Tip 35: How Does a Company “Fail” in a Market?”)

In most markets, failures move more market share than do wins. Competitor offerings are close enough to one another that most customers will not change suppliers readily. It is difficult to “win.” On the other hand, it is much easier to “fail” in a customer relationship. You can fail to offer a new Function; allow your Reliability reputation to erode; you can stretch out the order cycle time on the customer and fail in Convenience; or you can hold prices high and fail in Price.

Deere has a two-fold “failure” in this marketplace. It is failing its end users because it stretched out its order cycle time. Deere failed on Convenience for the end users. A more important failure, though, has occurred with its channels of distribution. Deere is failing its channels in Reliability. It does not have product when they have a market. Of the two failures, the Reliability failure is the more important. Over the years, we have seen many markets where customers will take on a secondary role supplier in order to ensure that they never are short of product when they need it. (See “Audio Tip #12: Supplier Roles and the Customer Buying Hierarchy” on StrategyStreet.com.)

Deere succeeded in beating its major competitors in managing the profit decline over the last year. Their better profit management was the result of its aggressive cost management. On the other hand, its cost management is now causing it to lose market share due to failures of Convenience and Reliability. In the long run, Deere’s profit calculus is likely to work against them.

Pricing Flexibility

Monsanto is the dominant leader in the seed business. It has led in the development of genetically modified seeds for corn, soy beans and cotton. This spring, the company introduced new second generation versions of its herbicide tolerant soy bean line and its herbicide and pest resistant corn seed. The company expected to sell enough of the soy bean line to plant 8 to 10 million acres and enough of the corn line to plant 4 million acres. Instead, the farmers bought 6 million acres worth of the soy bean line and 3 million acres worth of the corn line. The overall demand for seeds was down somewhat due to the depressed economy, but DuPont’s Pioneer Hi-Bred seed line also gained share against Monsanto.

The problem Monsanto encountered went beyond the economy. It simply priced the new lines too high for the market. The new soy bean line cost 42% more than its predecessor. The new corn line 17% more than its predecessor. The company simply did not leave enough incentive for enough farmers to make the switch to hit the company’s volume targets. (See “Audio Tip #68: Producing a Net Value Improvement for Customers” on StrategyStreet.com.)

The company responded quickly. After watching the market make a shambles of its volume forecasts, it announced that it would reduce its pricing by enough to increase its market share again.

This speedy response by a company in the marketplace stands in stark contrast to our governmental response to high pricing. If governments set a price too high, both consumers and the suppliers suffer. Current examples are the government interventions in the market to fix minimum wages and to increase taxes on employment.

In simple terms, the government sets a minimum wage price that is generally above the price that some employers are willing to pay. This new price, whether a minimum wage or an additional tax on employment, depresses demand for employees at the same time as it raises the potential supply. In a market where there is already more supply than demand, this is a prescription for a great deal of pain for both employees and employers. Some employers will shift jobs to less expensive areas of the world or simply not do them. Some employees will simply not find work. In particular, the employees least likely to find work are those with the lowest levels of skills, primarily the young and uneducated.

Throughout the post-war period, Europe created a cradle-to-grave system of social protections. They financed these social protections with high tax rates, charges on employment, and restrictions on the ability of an employer to reduce its workforce. At the end of 2009, Europe faced high employment rates for its young people. Belgium, France, Italy, the U.K., Sweden and Finland had rates of unemployment for people under 25 around 20% to 30%. The U.S. is now approaching the same level. Its unemployment rate for workers under 25 is about 20%, while overall unemployment rate is around 10%. The unemployment rate among black teenage males is 50%.

Not all of this high unemployment will go away with the reduction in the cost of employment. Some of our unemployed youth simply must have training they do not have today. But we show no signs today of recognizing what our high cost employment system has done to the demand for our youngest potential employees. It is too bad that our politicians don’t measure success in market share terms. Monsanto does and reverses course. Our response, if it ever comes, will be very late. (See "Video #41: Pricing Considerations in Hostile Markets” on StrategyStreet.com.)

Yep, Those Germans are the Problem

There has been much press over the last few weeks about the problems in the Euro Zone. Most particularly, we have learned more than we may want to know about the problems of deficit spending in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. Just recently, though, we may have learned that the problem is not the deficit spending in those recessionary countries. No, the problem seems to be the Germans.

Over the last ten years those nasty Germans have kept the lid on labor cost growth and have jacked up their rates of productivity. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Some competitors automate to become the lowest cost players” on StrategyStreet.com.) These simple actions have enabled Germany to compete on price despite high labor rates and competition from countries in the Euro Zone with nominal lower labor costs. Oh, those countries include Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. Those inconsiderate Germans have produced a Euro 136 billion trade surplus in 2009. Spain, Greece and Portugal ran significant deficits. The Finance Minister of France has suggested that Germany’s export dependent growth model may be causing a lot of the problem in the Euro Zone. Her answer to this problem is for Germany to begin spurring domestic demand. So we see that the problem in the Euro Zone is people who do not deficit spend and who take advantage of all their poorer neighbors who do deficit spend.

This is causing turmoil in the Euro Zone that, in the long run, is almost certainly bad for the Euro. Some countries might have to exit the Euro Zone. Greece has threatened to use IMF resources to continue its deficit spending. The economic disunity in the Euro Zone is creating political disunity as well. There is a question whether the Euro Zone can continue in its present form.

We have similar situations among the states in the United States. The differences are that the states can not threaten to withdraw from the Dollar Zone, nor are they eligible for IMF financing. Our deficit financing states tend to be those with the highest labor costs. As a result, the unemployment rate in these states is higher, often much higher, than that in the country as a whole. In January of 2010, the United States national unemployment rate, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, showed an average of 10% unemployment in the country. The highest unemployment occurred in Michigan, with a 14.3% rate. Other high unemployment states included Rhode Island, California, Illinois and Ohio. In many of these states, labor costs are not only high, but they are inflexible. Companies can not change work rules, nor adjust rates of labor, to match the current economy. That’s part of the reason that jobs flee these states.

In the Euro Zone, German workers have wages and benefits among the highest in Europe. They average Euro 34 an hour, roughly $48 an hour. Recently, the German Metal Workers Union accepted a new contract with very low wage growth in order to protect their jobs in Germany.

Here is a contrast for you. In 2008, the average worker for the “Big Three” automakers earned $73 an hour in total compensation. Workers at Toyota, and other foreign makers, earned an average of $48 in their U.S. operations. These companies have located their U.S. plants in areas where labor is more flexible. The average U.S. manufacturing worker earned something less than $32 an hour in 2008. These labor cost disparities help us understand how Detroit is losing population. Nearly a quarter of its manufacturing jobs have left. The city suffers from a 50% unemployment rate. Detroit’s woes certainly have contributed to Michigan’s nation-leading 14.3% unemployment rate. But isn’t some of this woe self-inflicted? Why can’t domestic automakers make cars in the U.S. for $48 an hour?

The German unions have learned that they can sustain their high rates of pay only so long as they help their companies become more productive with every hour of labor. The workforce shares a large portion of the improvement in productivity. (See “Audio Tip #187: The Components of Productivity” on StrategyStreet.com.) Apparently, at least one of our leading labor unions does not share that calculus.

Retailers as the Source of Creativity

It seems that retailers are often on the leading edge when it comes to innovation and creativity in their crafting offerings. They have an excellent sense of how their customers think.

For example, a couple of years ago, McDonald’s instituted a product offering around the change that a customer was about to receive for his order. Software the company had purchased created a discount offering that allowed the customer to take another item for the change, or slightly less than the change, he was about to receive from his original order. A high proportion of customers accepted these offers. (See “Audio Tip #53: Setting Specific Company Objectives for Many Customers” on StrategyStreet.com) While the additional product was offered at a discount, it still increased the margin on the sale.

Family Dollar stores offer another example. This company has done very well over the last 18 months, despite the recession. In fact, consumers naturally turned to Family Dollar and other very low-priced stores during these difficult times when their budgets are pressured. Family Dollar is not resting on its laurels. In fact, it is adjusting its offerings to fit its current customer needs. Their principal hope today is to retain the new customers it has attracted over the last 18 months. The company has found that customers are focusing on their needs, rather than their wants. So Family Dollar has added more food items and reduced offerings of appliances and other home categories. The company is also trying to increase its share of its customers’ purchases. It hopes to increase the total purchases on each customer’s visit and to shift some of those additional purchases to higher margin items. (See “Audio Tip #60: Customer Segmentation by Needs” on StrategyStreet.com.)

It offers the following example of its marketing changes to increase sales: If the company advertises underwear and laundry detergent in its regular flyer, both items may increase proportionately in sales. However, the laundry detergent often brings with it additional purchases that would be used with the detergent, such as fabric softeners, bleach and paper towels. These latter additional items carry higher margins because they are not included in the regular flyer discount offerings. The company has found that sales containing laundry detergent advertised in the flyer were 14 times more likely to include fabric softener, which wasn’t advertised, than the average transaction.

Retailing has become a data-hungry industry, and the retailers have grown in their understanding of customer needs by mining that data to develop creative merchandizing innovations that help both their customers and their bottom lines.

Look Out Below

The small consumer battery business is in the midst of a price war. The short-term losers in this war will be the industry leaders. But the longer term losers would be the low-end Price Leader competitors in the market.

Energizer Holdings is the industry leader’s market share, with a 39% share. Procter and Gamble follows closely with its 36% share of the market with its Duracell line. Low-end private label suppliers make up most of the remaining market. (See the Symptom and Implication, “Most competitors are offering low prices after a period where leaders held prices high” on StrategyStreet.com.)

The price wars have been a feature of this industry over the last couple of years. In the latest move, Procter and Gamble has offered a discount-in-kind for its packages of batteries. The former 20-pack package will go to 24 batteries. The 16-pack will go to 20 and the 8-pack will go to 10. All of these changes in batteries-per-pack will come without an increase in price for the package. So, the price per battery in these packages will fall 20% to 25%. Analysts estimate that this will translate to an 8% to 10% reduction in average price for the entire Duracell line. This is, indeed, a significant price reduction.

Energizer has no choice but to follow this Duracell price reduction. Consumers have shown little loyalty to either brand when there is a price difference involved in the purchase decision. Energizer will either follow or lose share quickly. It will follow.

Any time an industry leader loses 10% of its revenues, without reducing its cost by an equivalent amount, the pain on the bottom line is extreme. The average business unit makes a pretax return on sales of about 9% (See StrategyStreet/Tools/Benchmarks). The batteries are more profitable than average, but losing 10 percentage points off your previous margin structure will hurt anyone. So, both industry leaders, Duracell and Energizer, will suffer in the short term.

You might ask yourself, why would two companies who, between them, own 75% of the market engage in a price war with one another? In normal situations, they would never do this. But, battery prices have been high for a while. The industry leaders have held a price umbrella over cheap, private label, brands who have gained share over the recent years. This price war is really aimed at the Price Leaders. They will be the long-term losers in this war.

The private label brands do not have the margin structure that will allow them to take equivalent price reductions in order to keep a significant price advantage over Duracell and Energizer batteries. This price war will cripple them and reduce their ability to maintain the quality of their products and services.

Buy your consumer batteries now. Within a couple of years, the cheap private label brands will have suffered and fallen on hard times. Then, they will gladly follow the inevitable future price increase that the industry leaders will institute to make up for the margin losses of today.

This periodic price war to knock back private label competitors is a common pattern in consumer products. You will see it frequently with well-known consumer brands in cereals, soups, cigarettes, detergents and other products. In these markets, high prices support high marketing costs and high margins, and allow private label suppliers to grow market share for a period of time. Eventually, the branded companies reduce prices, sometimes drastically, to remove the private labels’ price advantages and drain them of market share (see the Symptom and Implication, “As large competitors match low prices, other competitors face difficulties” on StrategyStreet.com).

Can the Small Survive?

After months of back and forth, Kraft Foods has now reached a firm agreement to buy Cadbury. This may be a good thing for Kraft. Warren Buffett demurs due to the price. The jury is out. However, this merger may not be good for some of the other competitors in the industry. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The industry is consolidating through mergers and acquisitions” on StrategyStreet.com.) In particular, some industry observers are pointing to the precarious position of Hershey. They note that Hershey will be a very small competitor in the global confectionary business. That may be, but I would not be so fast to write off Hershey’s chances of survival. Often the smaller firms are more profitable than the largest firms in the industry.

A few years ago, we analyzed 240 industries that had five or more competitors reporting line of business sales of at least $50 million. (See the Perspective, “Is Bigger Really Better” on StrategyStreet.com.) In each of these industries, we studied the top four competitors measured in sales. We evaluated their market shares and their returns, looking for the benefits of natural economies of scale.

We calculated the percentage of time that a company ranked first in market share was also the leader in pre-tax return on assets. Pure chance would have seen the industry’s market share leader lead in returns 25% of the time. We found some economies of scale at work. In all of the 240 industries, we saw that the industry market share leader led the industry in returns on assets 29% of the time, only 4% more than random chance.

Surprisingly, the distant followers can sometimes be powerful competitors. In our study, the competitor ranking fourth in market share led its industry in returns 23% of the time, only 2% less than the 25% random chance.

So, Hershey is far from dead on arrival. This is not to argue that Hershey has an easy time of it. Quite the contrary. But it can survive, and even thrive, even in a more competitive confectionary market. (See the Perspective, “Rare Mettle: Gold and Silver Strategies to Succeed in Hostile Markets” on StrategyStreet.com.) To do so, though, it will have to be quite astute in its choice of product benefits and in its management of its smaller-than-average cost structure.

A Concentrated Industry

Over the last few years, the exchange traded fund (ETF) business has exploded as the advantages of exchanged traded funds attract investors away from individuals picking stock or investing in mutual funds. (See "Audio Tip #1: Defining a Business” on StrategyStreet.com) The industry manages nearly three quarters of a trillion dollars in assets.

Many fast-growing industries are not highly concentrated. This industry is concentrated. The top three providers control 84% of assets under management. In the average industry, it takes about four competitors to control 84% of the industry (see Benchmarks/Market Shares on StrategyStreet.com).

The ETF industry leader, by far, is BlackRock. BlackRock recently bought the iShares operation from Barclays Global Investors. It bought a very successful business. BlackRock manages 49% of the assets invested in ETFs. This compares with the median number one player in an industry at 39% market share.

The second player in the industry is State Street Global Advisors. This company has a 23% market share. Their 23% compares with the median number two competitor in an industry with 18%.

The third player in the ETF industry is Vanguard. Vanguard owns a 12% market share. This market share is not far off from the average number three competitor in an industry, at 11%.

From the share statistics, it is clear that the unusual concentration in the ETF industry rests primarily with the top two players.

These share concentration ratios for the ETF business may fall over the next few years. New competitors are pouring in the door, offering alternative ETF vehicles. But the big changes are likely to come from Charles Schwab. Charles Schwab has begun offering ETFs with commission-free trading, in other words, lower prices.

As fast-growing industries develop, their early stages witness a predominance of Function innovations, where companies offer something new for the user of the product. As the innovations in Function begin to wane, fast-growing industries witness more price-based competition. This price-based competition then leads to a period of shake-out in the developing industry. (See “Audio Tip #34: How Does a Company “Win” in a Market?” on StrategyStreet.com.)

It looks like Charles Schwab has fired the first major shot in this price-based competition in the ETF business. It should be an interesting battle. (See the Symptom & Implication “The industry is seeing its first price wars” on StrategyStreet.com.)

The eBook Competition

Amazon and its Kindle products have had the eBook market to themselves since the market began taking off a couple of years ago. The eBook market is now starting to grow fairly fast. Sony has decided to grab some of that growth.

Sony is entering the market with three price points: a $199 entry product called the Reader Pocket Edition, the $299 Reader Touch Edition with a touch screen and the high-end Reader Daily Edition at $399 with both touch screen and wireless capability.

Very fast-growing markets see market share changes due to Function and Price innovations. Let’s use the Customer Buying Hierarchy (see Audio Tip #95: Customer Buying Hierarchy on StrategyStreet.com) to evaluate Sony’s prospects against Amazon.

The Customer Buying Hierarchy holds that customers buy using four major criteria: Function, Reliability, Convenience and Price. Customers go through the hierarchy in that specific order and purchase when there is one, and only one, competitor who can offer them a unique benefit.

Function refers to the way the customer uses the product. Function innovations in this eBook market are two types: hardware innovations and content. In hardware, Sony has two Price Points with a touch screen capability that Kindle does not offer. On the other hand, the regular Kindle 2 offers wireless downloads. The only Sony product that offers wireless is the high-end Reader Daily Edition at $399, compared to Kindles’ $299 Price Point. Without considering price, it is hard to call a winner when the Kindle 2 offers wireless connectivity while the Sony offers a touch screen.

Content is likely to be a different story. Sony has adopted the ePub format, which is an international format for digital books and publications. Amazon, on the other hand, offers eBooks which can be read only on Kindle 2 devices, a proprietary approach. Sony argues that its readers can download books from the local library using its format, saving costs. But libraries have only a limited number of digital copies of books available. And, if the market takes off, the authors and publishers are likely to severely limit the number of free library copies available to ereaders. Kindle, for its part, is the progeny of a book retailer. There are many books available through Amazon for the Kindle 2, far more than will be available for the Sony products. In addition, the Apple iPhone and the iPod Touch also allow their owners to read books in the Kindle 2 format. With its extensive experience and product platform already in the market, content providers are highly likely to choose the Kindle 2 format before choosing the Sony format, if they must make a choice. Certainly in the early going, the content, and thus the Function advantage, goes to Amazon and it’s Kindle 2.

Reliability refers to how a company keeps the promises it makes to its customers. For an end user customer, Reliability means that the product works and will be fixed promptly if it does not work. Amazon has a superb reputation for Reliability among consumers. Sony’s reputation is also good. However, since Sony produces mostly electronic gear, its reputation is unlikely to be as good as that of Amazon, who sells mostly digital products. I would guess Amazon gets a slight nod in Reliability.

Convenience refers to the ease with which a customer can buy and begin using the product. Sony’s products will be in 9,000 retail outlets, including all the leaders in the industry, this holiday season. Amazon sells its Kindle online. The customer can see and touch the Sony products in the many retail outlets. Seeing and touching a Kindle is much more difficult for the perspective Amazon customer. The nod in Convenience clearly goes to Sony.

Price is the last consideration. The Kindle 2 product has a price of $299. The Sony Reader Daily Edition has a price of $399. As we noted above, the Sony product offers a touch screen at this price. Kindle does not, at least not yet. The Sony product is a third more expensive than is the Kindle. This additional price is likely to make the Sony product a Performance Leader product (see Audio Tip #82: Performance Leader Products and Companies on StrategyStreet.com), rather than a true competitor for the leading Standard Leader position.

It is going to be difficult for Sony to make the $399 product the most common product in the market. Amazon’s Kindle has already established the industry standard for benefits and price. Sony would have been more successful offering its touch screen benefits at no price increase over the Kindle 2 Standard Leader product. Sony looks to be in a Leader’s Trap here. It will eventually have to reduce that price or see the product garner relatively little market share, likely well below 15% of the market.

Both Sony and Amazon would probably be better off if they responded to the content challenge each offers the other. Sony might try to license the Kindle software and offer that format, as well as the format. Then Sony could have competed on its strengths in making small electronic equipment. Amazon could add the ePub format to its software and open up a new world of content for its customers. This will become imperative for Amazon if a great deal of content comes available in the ePub format that is not also available in the Amazon proprietary format.

Sony in the Game Business

Sony has just introduced a new PlayStation3. This product comes in a new slim form factor. Its price is $299. This is a 25% reduction from the $399 price of the current model of the PlayStation3. The price cut comes as the PS3 has struggled against its competitors, whose products have carried lower prices. Sony was in a Leader’s Trap.

Not only is the PS3 struggling against lower-priced competitors, it is also facing the head winds of a badly depressed market. Industry sales of game hardware and software are down 29% from a year ago.

The problem? Even at the new price, the product is more expensive than the industry leader. Nintendo’s Wii console sells for $250. The wildly successful Wii sets the price bar for the heart of the market. Its total console sales have passed 20.7MM compared to just over 15.5MM for the Microsoft Xbox and about 7.9M for the PS3. A competing console price higher than $250 really focuses the customer’s attention on the value of the marginal benefits.

Sony justifies the fact that the PS3 will remain the more expensive console because it offers a Blu-Ray player. Customers may not see it that way (see the Perspective, “The Two Greatest Consultants in the World” on StrategyStreet.com). The new PS3 may end up as a high end, Performance Leader, product with limited market share.

Sony has climbed part way out of its Leader’s Trap (see Video #42: Leader’s Trap on StrategyStreet.com) but still has a way to go. You will see more of the same in our next blog.

Nokia Scores...and Fumbles

Nokia is an industry Standard Leader who struggles at the high end of the market.

Nokia demonstrates its grasp of the mass market with a recent pricing innovation in India. In that country, Nokia owns half the market. In order to encourage further growth in the market, Nokia plans to roll out new handsets in twelve rural Indian states. In these states, the company has allied itself with a microfinance organization that is buying the handsets from Nokia and selling them to women in rural areas on the installment plan for 100 rupees a week. 100 rupees is equivalent to about $2. These weekly installments continue for 25 weeks, for a total cost of $50 per phone. Nokia’s program makes phones more affordable to these new customers by providing them an extended payment option.

Nokia is not without its struggles, however. In the smart phone market, the company is beginning to lose share at a rapid rate. While still an industry leader, Nokia’s smart phone market share has fallen from 47.5% a year ago to 45% today. Apple and Research In Motion are the beneficiaries of Nokia’s share slippage.

This smart phone market is important to all industry participants. Smart phones are growing their share of the market. The Standard Leader phones are declining in sales, while smart phones continue to grow. They now account for 14% of the total handset market, up from 11% last year. These smart phones are Performance Leader products with substantial margins. They increase company profitability as well as growth.

One problem Nokia seems to be facing is that its applications don’t have the same ease of operation as do Apple’s offerings. Apple’s applications work better with one another than do Nokia’s. And Nokia has been slow to bring new functions to the market.

Nokia may be suffering from a phenomenon we call Price Point Bias. (See Audio Tip #89: Price Point Bias on StrategyStreet.com.) Price points, other than the Standard Leader price point, often cause Standard Leaders problems in an industry. Marketing oriented Standard Leaders dislike Price Leader products because they view them as trojan horses for lower market prices. Many also believe that low priced products depreciate the quality of the company’s brand name. At the opposite extreme, Standard Leaders dominated by an operations culture dislike Performance Leader products. They view these products as disruptive to the smooth flow of operations and to the low costs that smooth-running operations create.

For more information on this phenomenon, see StrategyStreet/Diagnose/Products and Services/Innovation for Customer Cost Reduction/Price Point Bias.

New Product in a Fast Growing Industry: Verizon Cloud Computing

Verizon Communications recently announced that it was entering the market for cloud computing. Cloud computing is a service that allows a business to increase its computing power by using the internet, network bandwidth, on demand, from facilities operated by companies like Verizon. This market is fast-growing because it allows businesses to save the costs of building and managing their own computer facilities. Let’s use the Customer Buying Hierarchy to evaluate the prospect for Verizon’s success.

The Customer Buying Hierarchy (see “Video 27: Full Description of How the Customer Buying Hierarchy Works” on StrategyStreet.com) holds that customers buy a product using four categories of evaluation: Function, Reliability, Convenience and Price. Function (see “Video 13: Definition of Function” on StrategyStreet.com) refers to the features of the product that affect how it is used. Reliability (see “Video 14: Definition of Reliability” on StrategyStreet.com) refers to the benefits of the product that assure the customer that it works and will continue to work. Convenience (see “Video 15: Definition of Convenience” on StrategyStreet.com) refers to the ease with which the customer may find and purchase the product. Price is the cash cost the customer pays for the product.

Verizon offers a valuable Function advantage. Cloud computing is a service that today is targeted at large corporations. These corporations use several different types of computers and software applications. Verizon has made a Function innovation leap by offering customers options in setting up their cloud service that would include being able to use various types of computer servers, depending on the software applications the business needed to use. But this is early in the game, so many Function innovations have yet to be introduced.

Verizon, along with its telecom competitor AT&T, does have some real Reliability advantages. These companies have spent years managing network services, data infrastructure and transfer. (See the Perspective, “Reliability: The Hard Road to Sustainable Advantage” on StrategyStreet.com.) This gives them real credibility with corporate customers. Verizon and AT&T also have a significant Convenience advantage in their global reach. (See the Perspective, “Convenience: Much Tougher Than it Looks” on StrategyStreet.com.) These two phone companies are able to offer cloud services to overseas divisions of companies.

Pricing is the great unknown. Low prices can move a lot of share in a fast-growing market. Neither Verizon nor AT&T are what you would consider sharp pricing companies in their other businesses. It is unlikely, then, that they will be aggressive price competitors. On the other hand, Amazon also plans to enter this marketplace. Amazon has learned to compete aggressively on Price and may be the eventually price-setter in the market.

This is very early in the development of the cloud computing market. Unique Function advantages may emerge and remain unique due to legal barriers. The early Reliability and Convenience advantages strongly favor Verizon and AT&T with their technical competence, corporate reputations, and global reach. One, or both of them, should be very successful in cloud computing, assuming that they don’t get tripped up with high prices.