A Likely End Game to Hostility

The hard disk drive business has been a lousy place to compete for nearly twenty-five years.  It has been the graveyard of many competitors.  Twenty years ago, there were eighty disk drive manufacturers.  By the mid-90s, there were only fifteen.  By 2001, there were eight, and today it appears there are only four.  But the fact that we are at four competitors, especially the size of the leading competitors, means that the industry is likely to come out of its recurring bouts of overcapacity and hostility. 

As 2011 began, there were five hard disk drive manufacturers.  Western Digital led the market with a 31% market share, followed closely by Seagate with a 29% market share.  Hitachi enjoyed an 18% market share, while Samsung and Toshiba shared the remaining 22% of the market.  Recently, Western Digital agreed to purchase Hitachi.  This acquisition would bring Western Digital’s potential market share to 49%.  The top two of the remaining four competitors would then have a potential market share of 78%.  The top three would have more than 85% of the market. 

Hitachi was not just any other competitor in the market.  It had a well deserved reputation for being the most aggressive price discounter in the market.  Hitachi was the major reason that pricing stayed under pressure in the hard disk market.  Western Digital’s acquisition removed the major discounter.

In the past, acquisitions among the hard disk drive manufacturers brought somewhat better margins to the remaining players, but not as much market share as the acquisition would suggest.  The reason was customers rotating other strong suppliers into their relationships to maintain low prices.  With only four players left, and a dominant leader in the market, there is little purpose for the three followers to discount against Western Digital.  A discounter might pick up some temporary share in a market saturated with “last look” arrangements, but it might face a very aggressive pricing response by one or both of the remaining leaders in the market.  No, rather than discount, the economics for all the players would argue for firm industry pricing.  That is the most likely outcome of this acquisition.

Over the years, we have studied many industries in overcapacity.  Overcapacity produces a hostile market, where returns are low and price competition remains intense.  These kinds of markets end in one of two ways, either demand picks up and sops up the industry’s overcapacity, or the industry consolidates to the point where the top four competitors control 85% or more of the industry’s volume.  The remaining players then demur from competitive price discounts. The majority of industries see demand growth pull them out of hostile conditions.

There is one potential fly in this hard disk ointment.  Computer tablets and other portable devices don’t use hard disk drives.  Instead, they use NAND flash drives.  These are solid state drives.  They are more expensive than hard disks, have a much smaller form factor and are generally more reliable.  Samsung, Toshiba and SanDisk are the leaders in this market.  It could happen that Samsung and Toshiba, two of the four remaining hard disk drive suppliers, use low prices in the hard disk market to create customers for their more expensive flash drives.  It is more likely, however, that these two companies, who are distant followers in the hard disk market, would prefer to see higher prices for hard disks.  These higher prices on a competitive product would help some customers in the market transfer alliance to flash drives.

This acquisition should be a good deal for the remaining four hard disk players.  While some analysts have argued that the hard disk drive market will slowly die under the pressure of the growth in the applications of flash drives, industry observers still see an 8% per annum unit growth for this market over the next five years.  That unit growth should come with better margins for the remaining players.

The Fall of an Industry Leader - Part II

Blockbuster declared bankruptcy in September of 2010. According to reports, the company was done in by the online service of Netflix and the in-retail store kiosks of Red Box. That is only partly true. The company was done in, first by its failure to recognize and respond to market opportunities when others created them and, second, by its determination to extract higher prices than its performance in the market warranted. Its failure as a company was a long time coming. It started in the late 1990’s. Since 2002, the company has lost more than $4 billion. Its market value fell from $4 billion eight years ago to just $12 million at the time of the bankruptcy.

In Part 2, we will look at some of the highlights of Blockbuster’s pricing over the last few years.

This may seem surprising, but the industry’s prices began their long-term decline as early as 1982. This is not unusual. Fast-growing industries often see price declines as new competitors enter the market with plenty of capacity to serve even fast-growing demand.

* In the early 90s, Blockbuster changed its pricing scheme. It had offered a movie for two nights at $3. Blockbuster changed its price to $2.50 per night. It also charged late fees. This change in pricing hurt smaller competitors, who often got business when Blockbuster was out of product due to its two-night rental policy.

* By 1994, Blockbuster felt it could raise prices with impunity, and it did raise prices. (See the Perspective, “Can We Raise Margins With a Price Increase?” on StrategyStreet.com.)

* By 1997, prices were coming under pressure due to the fall-off in demand growth caused by other forms of competition. Blockbuster and its video tape competitors had to begin reducing prices. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The Industry is Seeing its Frist Price Wars” on StrategyStreet.com.)

* In 1997, Blockbuster introduced customer loyalty campaigns to hold on to its most important customers. By then the company was earning less than its cost of capital.

* In 1999, Blockbuster introduced a rewards card. The card cost about $10 and allowed a card-holding customer to obtain one movie free each month. It also offered one free movie for every five rented in a month, and one free “Favorites” on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays. This was an attempt to create greater sales with existing customers. Movies rented for $4 a night, but late fees could often double or even triple that cost.

* In 2002, video on-demand began to grow. One company offered 430 movies for an average of $3 per rental.

* By 2002, several consumer-oriented articles argued that the late fees charged by Blockbuster would be enough to cover the cost of a Netflix subscription. Customers grew angry over the late fee prices.

* In 2002, Blockbuster responded directly to Netflix with three pricing plans. First, a customer could rent two videos at a time for $20 a month. Second, the customer could rent three videos at a time for $25 a month. In the third program, a customer could pay about $60 a year. This would allow the customer to keep three movies during the year without late fees, but the customer would have to pay for all movies rented. In the meantime, Netflix continued charging $20 to rent three movies at a time.

What do we learn from watching Blockbuster’s pricing over the years? During the 80s and 90s, Blockbuster was leading the industry on pricing. This was a double whammy for its competitors. It offered bigger, better stocked stores at lower prices than its competitors. But somewhere in the mid-90s, Blockbuster lost its edge. It decided that it had earned the right to have higher prices simply because it was the leader. Netflix continually beat Blockbuster on pricing. Red Box did the same thing with its $1 per night rental charges. Blockbuster was in a Leader’s Trap, and stayed in that unfortunate position for far longer than most industry leaders. (See the Perspective, “The Leader’s Trap” on StrategyStreet.com.)

Blockbuster engineered its own demise by failing to keep up with the performance of the new leaders in the industry, such as Netflix and Red Box, and by charging more than its competition for performance that failed to match theirs.

What Happens When Giants Rumble

Over the last few years, Allstate Corporation, the big insurer of homes and automobiles, has concentrated its management efforts on producing industry-leading profitability. Profits have increased but the stock price has gone nowhere. And Allstate is losing market share.

Part of this market share loss is due to higher pricing than its key competitors. A look at market share changes suggests this fact. Both Geico and Progressive, who are known for aggressive pricing, have gained market share. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Large competitors are maintaining price levels as smaller competitors discount” on StrategyStreet.com.) Allstate’s market share has fallen, as have the shares of the smaller property and casualty insurers. The leader in the industry, State Farm, has gained market share.

Allstate is now altering course. The company’s top management has stated a goal to become the number one property and casualty insurer within the next ten years. At a minimum, this means Allstate’s market share must rise from today’s 10.5% in automobile insurance premiums to State Farm’s 18.6% market share, tough to do in a market growing only 3% a year. Allstate’s first priority is to stem the loss of current customers and then to find a way to develop programs that will enable them to gain market share. (See “Audio Tip #40: The Components of Market Share Change” on StrategyStreet.com.) A substantial part of these initiatives will involve more aggressive pricing.

This new pricing posture has begun to emerge. In Illinois, Allstate’s home state, the company recently offered a 5% discount to Geico customers who would switch to Allstate. In addition, the company is offering a one time bonus to customers who will agree to buy directly from its web site.

These are opening salvos in a price war. Price discounting begun by the second ranked competitor in the industry is going to effect every other competitor. Prices are going down, margins are going down and no one can avoid the battle. (See the Symptom & Implication, “As large competitors match low prices, other competitors face difficulties” on StrategyStreet.com.) As long as State Farm avoids the Leader’s Trap, the competitors who are likely to suffer most will be the industry’s smaller players. These companies will suffer mightily in a price war. They manage cost structures that do not enjoy the economies of scale of their much larger competitors.

These smaller competitors are likely to begin to fail in the marketplace. As they do, they may become acquisition candidates for Allstate. Acquisitions may, indeed, be a profitable route toward Allstate’s market share goal.

Can the Small Survive?

After months of back and forth, Kraft Foods has now reached a firm agreement to buy Cadbury. This may be a good thing for Kraft. Warren Buffett demurs due to the price. The jury is out. However, this merger may not be good for some of the other competitors in the industry. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The industry is consolidating through mergers and acquisitions” on StrategyStreet.com.) In particular, some industry observers are pointing to the precarious position of Hershey. They note that Hershey will be a very small competitor in the global confectionary business. That may be, but I would not be so fast to write off Hershey’s chances of survival. Often the smaller firms are more profitable than the largest firms in the industry.

A few years ago, we analyzed 240 industries that had five or more competitors reporting line of business sales of at least $50 million. (See the Perspective, “Is Bigger Really Better” on StrategyStreet.com.) In each of these industries, we studied the top four competitors measured in sales. We evaluated their market shares and their returns, looking for the benefits of natural economies of scale.

We calculated the percentage of time that a company ranked first in market share was also the leader in pre-tax return on assets. Pure chance would have seen the industry’s market share leader lead in returns 25% of the time. We found some economies of scale at work. In all of the 240 industries, we saw that the industry market share leader led the industry in returns on assets 29% of the time, only 4% more than random chance.

Surprisingly, the distant followers can sometimes be powerful competitors. In our study, the competitor ranking fourth in market share led its industry in returns 23% of the time, only 2% less than the 25% random chance.

So, Hershey is far from dead on arrival. This is not to argue that Hershey has an easy time of it. Quite the contrary. But it can survive, and even thrive, even in a more competitive confectionary market. (See the Perspective, “Rare Mettle: Gold and Silver Strategies to Succeed in Hostile Markets” on StrategyStreet.com.) To do so, though, it will have to be quite astute in its choice of product benefits and in its management of its smaller-than-average cost structure.

Acquisitions to Gain Product Capability

There are three primary reasons to make an acquisition. First, the acquirer may use the acquisition to reduce its cost by consolidating and reducing the total cost of overlapping cost functions. Second, the acquirer may seek to gain a new set of customers. And, third, the acquirer may be seeking a product capability which it does not have. In general, we believe that a successful acquisition will meet at least two out of these three criteria.

Recently, both Apple and Google have made important acquisitions. (See “Audio Tip #104: Where is the “Profit” in Expansion?” on StrategyStreet.com.) Both of these acquisitions have the bonus of acquiring a product capability that the company needs. Google acquired AdMob, a company which places ads on mobile web sites and applications. This is a very fast-growing market. Apple, shortly afterwards, followed suit by acquiring Quattro Wireless, a smaller competitor of AdMob. Google needs this acquisition in order to extend its advertising expertise into the mobile market. Apple needs its acquisition in order to make some revenues on the many free apps that run on its iPhones.

Which of the two companies is likely to be more successful in its acquisition? (See “Audio Tip #200: Using Acquisitions to Create Economies of Scale” on StrategyStreet.com.) Apple should certainly be able to generate revenue relatively quickly because there are so many free apps already out for the iPhone, which run on an advertising business model where the app is free to the consumer. On the other hand, Apple’s culture is hardware oriented. The company may have difficulties in dealing in a largely service-oriented market.

That won’t be Google’s problem. It already lives in the advertising world. In addition, AdMob is a much larger company than is Quattro. Google is likely to have acquired a new product capability with a lower cost structure than its Apple/Quattro Wireless competitor.

Consolidation as Growth Slows

Recently, Vodapfone and Hutchison Whampoa announced that they will combine their Australian mobile telecommunications businesses into a joint venture. Currently, Vodapfone is the third ranked competitor in the Australian market, while Hutchison is the fourth. The combined subscribers of the new firm will still rank third in the market, but a relatively strong third.

This is a pattern common to an industry as its high growth begins to slow. Once an industry begins to slow down, the top competitors in the industry are usually capable players. These top competitors are unlikely, and unwilling, to cede share willingly to another competitor. In that situation, growth and market share is likely to come by way of consolidations, such as this one, or acquisitions.

A very important determinant of the success of these consolidations is whether the new company can retain all of the customers the two firms previously owned. (See the Perspectives, “Buying Share, Not Sand” and “Acquisitions: The Buy or Win Decision” on StrategyStreet.com.)