Thursday, January 27, 2011
Evolution of the Smart Phone Market
Apple really made the market take flight with its original iPhone. Apple has migrated into the high-end, Performance Leader, part of the market with its iPhone4, selling for $199 with a two year contract. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The industry leaders are losing share” on StrategyStreet.com.) Wisely, Apple kept its old iPhone3 GS on the market as a lower-cost product, selling for $99 with a two year contract.
Competitors have been stumped trying to outflank Apple with new and better functionality. Apple simply has too many apps for most competitors. Only the Android phones, using the Google operating system, have gained share. Nokia and Research In Motion have both lost substantial share in the smart phone market. So, what are the competitors to do? (See the Symptom & Implication, “Competitors in formerly underdeveloped markets have begun meeting one another” on StrategyStreet.com.)
In this market, as in other Developing markets, the competitors strip out some of the expensive benefits of the product and introduce a new lower Price Point. In the smart phone market, the new lower Price Point still delivers one of the most important benefits of a smart phone, internet access. Because these new Price Points have fewer benefits, they cost less and allow the companies to sell to the carriers at lower prices than the Apple i4 product. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Low end products are gaining share of the market” on StrategyStreet.com.) In turn, the wireless service carriers offer lower priced package deals to their users when the packages include the new lower-priced smart phones.
Two developments are of note here. First, the evolution of the market. In this case, as in others, the market develops a new lower Price Point product that satisfies some of the basic needs of the current customer group. More importantly, the new Price Point attracts a new cohort of customers due to its lower prices. Second, prices decline in the market despite the fact that the market is growing very quickly. Prices are declining because costs are going down. Yes. But they are also declining under the press of competition in a market where margins are high enough to sustain lower prices with still-acceptable margins. Virtually all fast growing markets witness falling prices.
Monday, December 6, 2010
Nokia Makes a Bet in the Smart Phone Market
Nokia produces both the hardware and the operating system for smart phones. Its hardware is the handset and its software is either the Symbian or MeeGo operating systems. The company uses the Symbian software with its less advanced smart phones and the MeeGo system for the more advanced and more expensive phones.
Nokia is losing market share rapidly, especially to phones using Google’s Android operating system. Over the last year, the Symbian operating system’s market share fell from 45% to 37% of the market. In the meantime, Android has garnered 25% of the market, up from less than 4% a year ago. Nokia developed the MeeGo system to counter the flowing tide to both the Android and the Apple operating platforms. These platforms from Apple and Android have nearly shut Nokia out of the high end smart phone business in the U.S.
Nokia has decided against adopting the Android operating system for its phones. It is afraid that the adoption of Android would leave it competing in an increasingly less attractive hardware market, while the profits go to the operating software manufacturers. Nokia is undoubtedly right here. (See Video #3: Predicting the Direction of Margins” on StrategyStreet.com.) The question is, can they catch up fast enough?
Nokia is working hard to get the MeeGo system up to speed for developers. Today, the developers feel that the MeeGo operating system is in its early stages. It is attractive, though, because this operating system supports a number of different products that consumers use, including tablets, televisions and phones. And Nokia has acquired and developed software, called QT, that enables software developers to write an application once and have it work on a number of hardware products.
Nokia has time to get this right. The smart phone market is still a high-end, Performance Leader, product. It will take time for the mass market to adopt the smart phones and their operating systems. Nokia has a large base of customers using its phones and operating systems. Most of these customers would prefer not to leave a supplier they have come to know and like. If Nokia can pull its act together quickly, it can be a strong performer. And, certainly, there will be room for three operating systems in this market. In fact, if Nokia does well, it could still end up the long term leader, a position it has owned in the cell phone market for the last several years. Failing that, it has a reasonable chance to beat out the Apple operating system over the longer term. To accomplish this, Nokia must develop and use its superior economies of scale to price its products aggressively to take share again. (See Video #53: Productivity and Economies of Scale in Hostility” on StrategyStreet.com.)
But, there is a lingering question. Why not hedge the bet by developing Android phones as well? They could maintain good economies of scale and keep handset profits if their software bet fails.
Thursday, October 28, 2010
Microsoft Phone 7 - A Long Row to Hoe
Until this introduction, Microsoft’s market share in the mobile software business was dropping off a cliff. The company was one of the early entrants into the market. In 2004, it owned 22% of the market. By 2009, its share was down to 9%. Today it is about 5%. Microsoft was quickly fading away. But maybe the new software can help.
For a bit of perspective, we have to explain that there are five separate players involved in this marketplace: the operating system developers, the phone manufacturers, the wireless carriers, the software application developers and the ultimate users. Each of these entities are in separate businesses and represent separate competition. Microsoft plays in the market exclusively as an operating system developer. That’s what Windows Phone 7 is. The Google Android system is another stand-alone mobile operating software platform. So has been Hewlett Packard’s Palm mobile operating software. Three other competitors offer their operating software only in combination with their handset hardware. These include Nokia, with the Symbian operating system, Research In Motion’s Blackberry products and Apple’s iPhones.
The market share ranking today among those competitors in total operating software starts with Nokia’s Symbian, followed by Android, then Blackberry and Apple. Each of these has a market share that are multiples of Microsoft’s current share. Microsoft is fifth, followed by Palm and others.
The new Windows Phone 7 software is a wholly new product. It is completely different than the previous Microsoft mobile software. So different, in fact, that none of the thousands of applications written for the previous Microsoft software will work with Windows Phone 7. The company must start from scratch with applications.
Consumers love applications and make many of their buying decisions on the basis of these applications. (See the Perspective, “When to Compete on Features” on StrategyStreet.com.) Today, Apple has about 250,000 applications, followed by Android with about 70,000. The differences between the two are probably much less than these numbers would indicate because most of the popular applications are available on both platforms. You can see this in the marginal purchases. Android garners more of the current new purchases than does Apple. So, for all practical purposes, Apple no longer owns a significant application lead on Android.
Windows Phone 7 faces a real hurdle with applications. In some ways, it offers a few benefits over the Android and Apple operating systems. For example, it works off of “tiles” that enable a user to get information somewhat faster than in the Android and Apple software. It works easily with Microsoft Office software and it enables gamers to connect to online games easily. These are modest innovations at best, and likely to be followed by others quickly. For example, Motorola already produces software for its phones that pretty much duplicates Microsoft’s “tiles.” Apps are the big problem.
If you are an applications developer, Microsoft would likely be far down your list of the companies for whom you would write new application software for a smart phone. Android and Apple would lead the pack. Nokia, Research In Motion and others offer more current customers than Microsoft but pose difficulties for developers. Microsoft would fall below all these firms. Microsoft has to solve this problem quickly.
Application developers are also likely to be leery of Microsoft and its continued presence in the market. Not only has the company lost share, but it introduced a software platform called Kin in the spring of 2010 aimed at young people, between 12 and 20. This product did not stay in the market even two months. So developers are likely to hold fire on their application development for the Windows Phone 7 platform until they are relatively sure that the product will succeed.
Microsoft is backing its Windows Phone 7 introduction with a $100 million advertising program emphasizing the ease with which a user can get to the information most important to the customer. This seems to me to miss the mark. This advertising investment is a Convenience innovation that advises the customer why the Microsoft system is faster and, therefore, better. (See “Video 15: Definition of Convenience” on StrategyStreet.com.) But it seems that most of the smart phone purchases today are the result of other current users’ recommendations and demonstrations. This is a Reliability innovation. These current users are apt to emphasize the Function benefits of their phones rather than the speed of access to information.
Microsoft might have spent this money differently. It is already paying some developers to create applications for its platform. My guess is that their $100 million might have been much better spent paying for applications, where Microsoft is likely to fail on the basis of lack of Functions rather than paying for the Convenience innovation of advertising.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Paying Attention to Low-End Competitors
There are a number of cell phone operating systems from which to choose. The major suppliers include Microsoft, Google, Apple, Nokia and Research in Motion. Google is the newest entry here, and is beginning to make waves with its free Android operating system. (See “Audio Tip #33: Strong vs. Weak Competitors” on StrategyStreet.com.)
There are two separate sets of customers for these operating systems. The first, and most important, are the carriers. The four major carriers include AT&T, Verizon, Sprint and TMobile. A secondary set of customers are the handset makers. These companies are secondary because they conform to the demands of the carriers in the U.S. These handset makers include Samsung, LG, Sony Ericsson, Kyocera, Dell, HTC and Apple.
In the cell phone operating system market, Nokia is the leader with its Symbian operating system. Research In Motion, with its operating system for its BlackBerrys, is also strong. The key growth market today is the smart phone market, where Apple has 13% of the market. Apple is gaining market share, at the expense of Windows Mobile, which has managed to hold on to 9% of the market. Google’s Android operating system is on only 2% of the world-wide smart phones. So should the operating system competitors fear Google’s Android? The answer is yes, for a couple of reasons.
The first, and most important, reason is that the largest carriers, all four of them, have agreed to offer Android phones. (See “Audio Tip #29: Positive vs. Negative Volatility” on StrategyStreet.com.) Whenever the largest customers in the market agree to carry a product, that product has to be taken seriously by other competitors. The adoption of Android systems by the top four carriers argues that Android is a serious competitor.
The next reason is that most of the phone set makers have also adopted an Android operating system for some of their phones. Motorola eliminated Windows Mobile in favor of Android. HTC plans for half of its phones to run on Android this year. And Dell is using Android for its market entry. Most of the other competitors, including Samsung, LG, Kyocera and Sony Ericsson are also making Android devices. Apple will not offer an Android phone. So, the secondary customers have also spoken and affirmed that Android is serious.
Once the major customers have endorsed a low-end competitor, that competitor’s impact on the market will be pervasive. Android will not be a low-end competitor for long. Google will use its growth in the market to fund product innovations which will bring its operating system up to the standards of the better players in the market. Further, the growth of the Android system, which is free, will inevitably reduce the volume of sales or the price, and probably both, of the higher end operating systems. A low-end competitor who continues offering low prices while, at the same time, improving its product’s performance will reduce the margins of all other competitors in the industry. Its performance for price proposition will focus customers’ attention on the marginal differences that the higher end operating systems offer for their marginal prices, depressing either sales or prices. (See “Audio Tip #80: Measuring Customer Cost Savings” on StrategyStreet.com.)
Monday, August 24, 2009
Nokia Scores...and Fumbles
Nokia is an industry Standard Leader who struggles at the high end of the market.
Nokia demonstrates its grasp of the mass market with a recent pricing innovation in India. In that country, Nokia owns half the market. In order to encourage further growth in the market, Nokia plans to roll out new handsets in twelve rural Indian states. In these states, the company has allied itself with a microfinance organization that is buying the handsets from Nokia and selling them to women in rural areas on the installment plan for 100 rupees a week. 100 rupees is equivalent to about $2. These weekly installments continue for 25 weeks, for a total cost of $50 per phone. Nokia’s program makes phones more affordable to these new customers by providing them an extended payment option.
Nokia is not without its struggles, however. In the smart phone market, the company is beginning to lose share at a rapid rate. While still an industry leader, Nokia’s smart phone market share has fallen from 47.5% a year ago to 45% today. Apple and Research In Motion are the beneficiaries of Nokia’s share slippage.
This smart phone market is important to all industry participants. Smart phones are growing their share of the market. The Standard Leader phones are declining in sales, while smart phones continue to grow. They now account for 14% of the total handset market, up from 11% last year. These smart phones are Performance Leader products with substantial margins. They increase company profitability as well as growth.
One problem Nokia seems to be facing is that its applications don’t have the same ease of operation as do Apple’s offerings. Apple’s applications work better with one another than do Nokia’s. And Nokia has been slow to bring new functions to the market.
Nokia may be suffering from a phenomenon we call Price Point Bias. (See Audio Tip #89: Price Point Bias on StrategyStreet.com.) Price points, other than the Standard Leader price point, often cause Standard Leaders problems in an industry. Marketing oriented Standard Leaders dislike Price Leader products because they view them as trojan horses for lower market prices. Many also believe that low priced products depreciate the quality of the company’s brand name. At the opposite extreme, Standard Leaders dominated by an operations culture dislike Performance Leader products. They view these products as disruptive to the smooth flow of operations and to the low costs that smooth-running operations create.
For more information on this phenomenon, see StrategyStreet/Diagnose/Products and Services/Innovation for Customer Cost Reduction/Price Point Bias.
