News Corp Responds to the Market for “Free”

The newspaper industry has faced a mighty challenge over the last few years. There is so much “free” content to complete with them. Newspaper revenue continues to plummet. Internet users are reluctant to pay for content. All the free content, supported by advertising revenue, has decimated the newspaper industry. The industry’s cousin, the magazine industry, is not far behind.

This trend can’t continue forever. Already, many people are asking themselves how much they can trust the information on the internet. The need for Reliability drives the demand for Snopes.com. How many “free” web sites can earn enough from advertising to pay all their bills? An effective industry answer to “free” may be forthcoming in the News Corp online newspaper called “The Daily.” The Daily will cover general news, sports, arts and opinion in a format dedicated to the Apple iPad. In addition to the written content, the product will carry high definition video and 360 degree photos. The same product will be available in a few months for the Android-based tablet computers.

The Daily will sell for $.99 a week, or $39.99 a year, a very low price compared to newspapers. With this model, the product receives revenues both from the subscribers and from advertisers. Subscribers have the Reliability benefit of knowing that the content producer cares about facts, accuracy and readable writing style. Advertisers pay for eyeballs that follow a Reliable product.

The Daily is what we call a Next Leader product. This is a product that offers much better than industry standard performance for a low price to a specific subset of industry customers. The Next Leader can offer the very low price because it has a much lower cost structure than is typical in the industry. There are two basic types of Next Leaders. The first are Reformer products. This type of Next Leader product reduces the benefits for the user (usually Function benefits) while increasing the benefits for the buyer (usually Reliability and Convenience benefits) compared to the industry Standard Leader product. The second of the two types of Next Leader products are Transformer products. These products increase the benefits of the user but offer, at least initially, fewer benefits to the buyer than the Standard Leader product offers. The Daily is a Reformer product. It offers the Convenience of formatting fit for a tablet computer so it provides easier access for a segment of the industry’s customers. Its low cost structure results from its elimination of printing presses and distribution costs.

If this new tablet-based product offers a quality read, it will hasten the day when virtually every newspaper and magazine is offered first online and only secondarily in hard copy. The online versions will come at a fraction of the cost of the hard copy versions. Readership is certain to grow.

Direct Edge: A Transformer Next Leader Product

A Next Leader competitor is in an extremely fortunate position. A Next Leader is a competitor or product that offers much better than industry standard performance for a low price to a specific subset of industry customers. While offering better benefits to some customers, it may reduce benefits for others. But all Next Leaders offer low prices. The Next Leader can do this because it has a very low cost structure. (See “Video #22: Definition of Next Leaders” on StrategyStreet.com.) Next Leaders do not appear in many industries. When they do appear, they can change an industry, whether the industry is in manufacturing, retail or service. For example, Toys R Us invented the Toy Retailing Category Killer, a Next Leader product. Home Depot has done much the same in hardware retailing. Other Next Leaders include the early Apple personal computer, Intuit personal financial management software, Jiffy Lube in auto services and Domino’s Pizza.

We have studied many Next Leader competitors. Our study has suggested there are two kinds of Next Leaders products: Reformers and Transformers. A Reformer product is a type of Next Leader that reduces the benefits for the user while increasing benefits for the buyer, compared to the industry’s Standard Leader product. Jiffy Lube and Domino’s Pizza would both be Reformer Next Leader competitors. The second type of Next Leader competitor, Transformer products and companies, increase the benefits for the user of the product but offers, at least initially, fewer buyer benefits than the Standard Leader product. Toys R Us and Home Depot are two examples of Transformer Next Leader competitors.

Direct Edge is an example of a Transformer competitor. It offers its customers very fast securities trading on virtually any platform, from computers to smart phones. It is a young electronic stock exchange and it is having a big impact on securities trading. Its first noticeable impact is in market share. As recently as five years ago, the New York Stock Exchange accounted for 70% or more of the trading in the stocks listed on its exchange. Today, the stock exchange handles 36% of those trades. (See “Audio Tip #85: Evaluate the Company's Success in Penetrating each Price Point in the Market” on StrategyStreet.com.) Twelve other public exchanges, several electronic trading platforms and many “dark pools” command the rest of the market share in NYSE listed stocks.

Direct Edge came into existence during 2010. Several brokerage firms and other financial players formed Direct Edge to offer a counter veiling power to the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. Direct Edge now owns 10% of stock trading in the United States.

Direct Edge is not only big and fast-growing, but inexpensive as well. It has ready access to the share trading of its brokerage house and hedge fund owners. It operates many banks of state-of-the-art computers in warehouse-type facilities in New Jersey rather than in more-expensive New York. And, despite its size, it has fewer than one hundred employees.

The evolution of these non-traditional exchanges has resulted in declining trading costs and much faster trading times for all customers. Next Leaders do that.

The Kindle as a Razor

Amazon is proving to be a stubborn competitor. Many people thought Amazon would be severely damaged by the market entrance of the Apple iPad. After all, the iPad does many more things than simply provide an eBook reading experience. But, the Kindle is not going away easily. The company claims that it appeals to “serious readers,” which it estimates at about 10% of the population, and Amazon is chasing that 10% avidly.

Amazon is using the Kindle as a Loss Leader. Recently, a company estimated that the cost of the Kindle, that is all its parts and labor, was about $185. Amazon claims that the cost is much higher. This cost was not a great deal of the problem when the Kindle2 sold for $400, about its introductory price. Nor was it a problem when the Kindle sold for $289, the cost of the second version. Now, the new and improved Kindle3 has a price as low as $139, well below the estimated $185 cost. Amazon is taking a significant haircut on the cost of the Kindle in order to populate future customers for its eBooks. The company makes an attractive profit on its eBook sales and uses the Kindle as the razor to its eBook razorblades.

Amazon has also hedged its bet. Kindle eBooks also are readable on the iPad, so we are about to see an interesting contest between a very inexpensive Kindle and the iPad for the eyes of future eBook readers.

This razor and razorblade strategy is common (see StrategyStreet.com/Improve/Pricing/Reduce Prices). Here are some of the other places it has taken place:

* Caterpillar often reduced prices on new equipment in order to assure itself of the replacement parts business.

* The Palm Trio 600 had a list price of $600, but a consumer could buy it for as little as $330 with a phone service contract.

* Nintendo subsidized the sale of its game consoles in order to boost the sales of its game software.

* Restaurants offer free, or inexpensive, appetizers at the bar in order to increase alcohol sales.

* Charles Schwab offered a $400 analysis of a client’s holdings, including two hours worth of in-person advice, in order to increase the odds that it would be able to manage the client’s money for a yearly fee.

These Loss Leader pricing innovations are worthwhile whenever the revenues from the attendant products, which follow the Loss Leader product, are worth considerably more than is the Loss Leader.

Always Low Prices Meets Lower Prices

Wal-Mart has come to dominate the grocery industry by offering wide product choices and low prices in their 2700 super centers. The company today is the biggest of the industry’s Standard Leaders. (See “Audio Tip #181: Using Physical Measures to Control Costs” on StrategyStreet.com.) And because the company has a well earned reputation for low prices, it found new customers during the last recession.

But underneath the new customer growth it found that some of their Core customers had migrated even further down on the food chain to discounting competitors, such as Save-A-Lot and Aldi stores. These companies offer even lower prices. They are able to offer these lower prices because they are Strippers. These are low-end, Price Leader (see “Audio Tip #83: Price Leader Products and Companies”), competitors who strip benefits from the product offering in order to achieve a low cost structure and consequent very low prices, which attract price-sensitive customers.

Save-A-Lot and Aldi compete with similar business models. They offer from 1400 to 1800 items, which is a small fraction of the offerings in a typical supermarket. The vast majority of their products are private labeled. The stores themselves are small, 15,000 to 17,000 square feet, and the store displays and amenities are spartan. Still, these retailers are growing relatively rapidly in the U.S. Wal-Mart feels like it needs to respond to their growth.

Wal-Mart does offer smaller stores. Their Neighborhood Markets concept are grocery stores in small towns and suburbs. But these are larger formats, averaging 42,000 square feet. The company’s small store format, called Marketside, has a 15,000 square foot footprint but has achieved relatively little presence so far. The Marketside business model has yet to develop any vibrancy.

Can Wal-Mart succeed at the very low end of the marketplace? I wouldn’t bet against them. They have succeeded in Mexico by offering seven separate store formats to meet the needs of consumers at various budget levels.

The Tables Have Turned

Just a few years ago, Dell Computer was the darling of the PC industry. Hewlett-Packard was an also-ran. Today the tables have turned. Over the last year, Hewlett-Packard’s market share has jumped from 18.5% to 20% of the global PC shipments. Dell’s market share has fallen from 15.7% to 13.7%. The change in market share is customers saying that HP offers a better value proposition. (See the Perspective, “The Two Best Consultants in the World” on StrategyStreet.com.)

HP has strenuously reduced its costs at the same time it has gained market share. HP, at one time, was in the middle of the PC pack in costs. Today, its PC operating margin is 4.6%, better than Dell’s operating margin. The superior cost performance of HP is the competitors acknowledging that HP has a lower overall cost.

HP has gained much of its market in the retail side of the business, especially with lower-end products. Most Standard Leaders don’t like lower-end products because they offer low margins and not much reputation (see StrategyStreet/Diagnose/Products and Services/Innovation for Customer Cost Reduction/Price Point Bias).

HP is gaining some of its new market share with very low pricing, a characteristic that used to belong to Dell. Wal-Mart’s recent experience with HP is indicative of the company’s current aggressiveness. Wal-Mart wanted to sell a personal computer for less than the price of the hot Netbook products. Netbooks are mini laptops costing less than $500. Wal-Mart did the consumer research to produce specifications for the proposed full-sized laptop product and passed those to some PC companies. Several responded positively. Dell offered a product for just under $400. Toshiba and Acer offered a product priced just below $350. HP beat all the competitors, though, with a $298 machine.

Dell is allowing Hewlett-Packard to take market share with its low prices because it sees little profit in the low-priced machines. But there is a problem here. HP has already proven itself capable of using its large size to streamline logistics and extract lower purchases of costs from its suppliers. It has smartly redesigned its products to reduce their costs. How is it, then, that Dell, or anyone else, believes that they will be better off by ceding market share to Hewlett-Packard on the basis of low prices? Will Hewlett-Packard become weaker? Will the PC companies losing share become stronger? This is another example of companies in a Leader’s Trap.

From Cheap to Chic

Do you know what a Hyundai is? How about a Kia? Of course you do. They are South Korean automakers. Though they are not top of the consumer mind in the U.S., they are a rising pair. They both belong to the Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group. Globally, this automotive group is the fourth largest automaker. Toyota, General Motors and Volkswagen rank ahead of them. And the South Korean Group is gaining share at a rapid rate. Ten years ago it was the eleventh largest global automaker.

In the United States, Hyundai and Kia began life as Price Leaders. They produced small, cheap cars with relatively low quality. Twenty years ago, these manufacturers’ cars might have been a close substitute with a used car. Not so any more.

Hyundai has become better known with its 100,000 mile warranty, the best in the auto business. The company realized its poor quality reputation was holding it back and invested to improve quality. To convince the U.S. consumer that it was serious, it offered the best warranty in the business.

Hyundai is no longer simply a Price Leader. It has become a true Standard Leader. It has migrated up through the Standard Leader product class, with the Sonata, and has even entered the lower end of the Performance Leader class with the new Genesis. All of the company’s offerings, though, carry lower prices than those of competition.

The combination of low prices and good quality has propelled Hyundai, even in the hostile auto industry. Hyundai sales in the last year grew by 47%, while industry sales were up only 1%.

Hyundai is a good example of a Price Leader who morphs into a Standard Leader over time by offering good performance for a low price. (For more information on Price Points, visit the Diagnose/Products and Services section StrategyStreet.com.) Most Price Leaders don’t try to do this, but a few carry it off with aplomb. Hyundai is one of them.

Industry Contraction Exposes Potential Low Price Points

The legal industry is suffering just like the rest of us in this economy. Interestingly, not all legal firms are suffering. The firms that are suffering the most are the large firms, who have done well for many years. These firms typically bill their large clients between $700 and $800 an hour for legal work. They have more than 200 lawyers in the firm. The next tier down sees law firms with 200 or fewer lawyers. These firms typically bill clients between $200 and $500 an hour for work done by their senior partners. Overall, the smaller firms seem to be about 25% cheaper than their larger cousins. These smaller firms are actually growing in this economy. While their larger brethren are laying off lawyers, the small to medium sized firms are hiring today. (See Video #6: Competition and Low-Cost Expansion on StrategyStreet.com.)

These firms are hiring because many of the large clients for corporate legal work are shifting some of the work that they used to give to the larger, more expensive law firms, to these smaller firms. These clients have discovered that they have more than one type of legal need. And, at least in some cases, the legal need is for less skill and cost than the capabilities offered by the largest law firms.

Clearly, the larger law firms are having trouble adjusting their pricing to meet these cheaper legal competitors. It appears they could do so, at least in part, by acknowledging that there is more than one price point for legal work. (See Video #21: Definition of Price Leaders on StrategyStreet.com.) These larger firms might offer less senior staff at lower costs for projects that would be satisfactorily serviced with less experienced employees. They could create a lower price point that would enable the larger law firms to reduce the loss of business to the smaller firms.

The large clients for the larger firms will always need the larger firms for the most sophisticated transactions. But, in these straitened times, these clients have to reduce their spending. If the large law firms allow them to reduce this spending by shifting work to smaller firms, they are losing an opportunity to preserve their revenues. These revenues can go a long way toward covering the cash fixed costs that all law firms face. (See Video #56: Design to Value as an Approach to Cost Management on StrategyStreet.com.)

Another High Profit Industry Comes Under Assault

For many years now, large employers and governments have contracted with pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to provide and administer drug coverage for their employees. In turn, the PBMs tell the employers that they will pass on a good part of their purchasing economies to save the employers’ cost. This approach has worked well for the PBMs for years. They have been highly profitable businesses.

These high profits have attracted the attention of a new scary competitor, Wal-Mart (see “Video #3: Predicting the Direction of Margins” on StrategyStreet.com). Wal-Mart is offering businesses low-priced drugs if they sign up to have their employees purchase directly from Wal-Mart’s network of in-store pharmacies. Wal-Mart will offer these businesses a fixed mark-up over its cost for the drugs. While Wal-Mart will not reveal the cost of its purchases, it will have a third party verify the mark-up, thus guaranteeing the business of its deal. Wal-Mart benefits in two ways with this new business program. It guarantees a profit on each sale with its cost plus pricing. It also draws more customers into its stores where it has a chance to sell them other products.

This Wal-Mart product innovation follows on the heels of a similar consumer program they introduced some time ago. In this latter program, Wal-Mart introduced a $4 per subscription generic drug program for consumers. This drug program forced the entire retail drug industry to offer discount plans and it lowered the cost of drugs for consumers.

Wal-Mart is a discounter (See “Video #21: Definition of Price Leaders” on StrategyStreet.com). Will it succeed with this new business-oriented program? A discounter is likely to succeed if it can attract the largest customers in the market place. We call these Very Large customers. Wal-Mart has already attracted one of those very large customers in Caterpillar Company. Caterpillar has purchased drug coverage for 70M employees and their dependents through Wal-Mart. This customer has been so pleased with its savings in the drug benefit program that it has waived co-payments on generic prescriptions that its employees purchase from Wal-Mart. This, of course, makes the Wal-Mart program even more attractive to the employee because it is cheaper than any other alternative available.

The forecast? Costs down for businesses. Lower profits and growth for PBMs. (See the Symptom and Implication, "The industry leaders are losing share” on StrategyStreet.com.)

The Power of Low-End Products for Industry Leaders

Low-end products can save an industry’s bacon when the industry falls on hard times. Most low-priced products are what we call Price Leaders (see Audio Tip #83: Price Leader Products and Companies on StrategyStreet.com). These products offer less Function or Convenience than do the industry’s more important Standard Leader products, for common pricing savings of 25% or more. (See Audio Tip #81: Standard Leader Products and Companies on StrategyStreet.com.)

These Price Leader products are helping the domestic beer industry today. In the domestic beer industry, Price Leader products are called “sub-premium brands.” These brands saw sales gains of 8% over the last year. In contrast, the industry Standard Leader products, called “premium” beers, saw sales fall 1.4%. “Sub-premium” beers are keeping the industry moving forward. These “sub-premium” beers cost about 25% less than the premium beers, so they offer drinkers an attractive price alternative when the economy gets tough.

Most of the “sub-premium” beer volumes are products of the big brewing companies, including Anheuser-Busch InBev NV, SABMiller PLC, Molson Coors Brewing Company. (See the Perspective, “When Product Mix Matters” on StrategyStreet.com.) So the industry’s Standard Leader competitors have closed the door on erstwhile Price Leader, private label, suppliers of cheaper brews.

These Price Leader products also have a few cost advantages over the Standard Leader products. Most importantly, the big brewers rely on word-of-mouth and price-based impulse buys to generate sales. They spend very little on advertising these brands. On the other hand, they spend a great deal to advertise the “premium” Standard Leader brands. So, while profits are lower on the Price Leader products, the lower margins are no where in proportion to the lower prices these products seek.

Pricing Against a High-End Product

In StrategyStreet terminology, a Standard Leader is a company who sells the majority of its products at the most common industry price point. The most common product we call the Standard Leader product. At the high end of the market are those companies who offer products with extra features and services for prices starting about 10% higher than the Standard Leader product. We call those companies, and their products, Performance Leaders. In the personal computer industry, Apple is a Performance Leader; Dell and Hewlett Packard are Standard Leaders.

Apple introduced its Mac-Book Air laptop early in 2008. This was an ultra-thin machine that appealed to customers who wanted light weight and high style in their personal computer.

Somewhat later in the year, Hewlett Packard introduced its high end Voodoo Envy laptop. This is an example of a Standard Leader company introducing a Performance Leader product in competition with a Performance Leader company. (See the Symptom and Implication, “Customers are taking on more suppliers because shortages have appeared” on StrategyStreet.com.) This happens in most industries. Recently, Dell has announced its Adamo high-end personal computer. Dell claims the Adamo is the thinnest and the most stylish in the market. These three Performance Leader computers sell strictly on style. Their technical specs are not much different from other laptops, or from one another.

There is something interesting, though, in the way the computer industry Standard Leaders have priced their products against the Apple computer. The Apple Mac-Book Air sells for about $1800; Hewlett Packard’s Voodoo Envy sells for $1900; and Dell’s Adamo sells for $2000. The Standard Leader products carry prices above the price of the Mac-Book Air, the leading Performance Leader product.

This is an unusual approach to pricing. The Standard Leaders would like to take market share from Apple but they have given up one of their most powerful advantages, their low costs due to Economies of Scale and, potentially, lower prices. (See the Symptom and Implication, “The larger companies are squeezing out the smaller” on StrategyStreet.com.) A more robust approach is for the Standard Leader to use its superior economies of scale and distribution power to introduce a product somewhat below the price of the Performance Leader product. This enables the Standard Leader to introduce a product that will take share from the Performance Leader, slowing its growth and reducing its margins. Consider these examples of that pricing strategy.

* Toyota introduced the Lexus brand against Mercedes Benz at a price point of $39,000 compared to an average $50,000 Mercedes Benz price.

* MSN priced its broadband product at $39.95 to compete against AOL’s broadband at $44.95.

* The Palm PDAs competed against PDAs using Microsoft’s Pocket PC operating system at prices 20% or more below the pocket PC-driven machines from Compaq and Hewlett Packard. Then, smartphones undercut PDAs.

* Schwab’s 2% cash back credit cards carried no annual fees in competition with fee-bearing airline miles credit cards.

* McDonalds and Dunkin Donuts introduced high-end coffee drinks at prices nearly 50% below those of an equivalent drink at Starbucks.

* Kraft’s DiGiorno high-end frozen pizza came out at a price of $5.59 to compete against home delivery pizza at around $7.00.

My guess is that neither the Hewlett Packard nor the Dell high-end computer will have any impact at all on Apple and its Mac-Book Air.

Blockbuster vs. Netflix... Again

Blockbuster is under pressure, and has been for a number of years. It is closing hundreds of stores. Still, it continues to operate over 3,900 stores in the U.S. and nearly 2,000 outside the U.S. The reason for its struggles is simple: Netflix. Netflix beat Blockbuster by offering a better business model to the American consumer. Eventually, Blockbuster copied the Netflix business model. But by then, Netflix was a powerful competitor. Blockbuster has been unable to unseat Netflix from its position of movie rental leadership.

These two companies are about to square off again.

Blockbuster recently introduced a television set top box to deliver movies on-demand over the internet. Netflix also offers a similar service. We will use the Customer Buying Hierarchy (i.e. Function, Reliability, Convenience and Price) to analyze the two services and declare a winner before the battle starts. (See the Perspective, “How Customers Buy”, on StrategyStreet.com.)

Function refers to how a customer uses the product. With internet downloading, the key Function is number of movie titles available. Blockbuster offers 2,000. Netflix offers 12,000, though many of those are older movies, independent films and T.V. shows. The Function advantage, though, clearly goes to Netflix.

Reliability refers to the way a company delivers on the promises made or implied to its customers. Such benefits as product quality, warrantees and on time delivery define Reliability. The Blockbuster service offers something called “progressive downloading” in order to ensure that the consumer receives DVD quality on the movies downloaded. Netflix offers its internet video with standard streaming quality. Streaming quality can be variable, depending on the bandwidth and the type of connection used. With fast connections, standard definition content approaches DVD quality. The advantage on Reliability goes to Blockbuster.

Convenience refers to the ease with which a customer may purchase and install the service. Blockbuster offers a proprietary set top box produced by partner firm, 2Wire. Once the proprietary set top box is on the consumer’s television set, it takes a few minutes for a downloaded movie to begin playing because of the progressive downloading feature. The Netflix service does not require the proprietary set top box. In fact, it operates with a large number of hardware items, many of which are already attached to consumer televisions. Netflix connects through both TiVo DVRs and Microsoft’s Xbox360, for example. More consumer electronics manufacturers will add the Netflix streaming feature to their set top boxes in the future because it is likely to be popular. This implies that the cost of the hardware required to play Netflix movies is either low, because the consumer already has the product, or will fall in the future as more hardware competitors pile into the market. In addition, the standard streaming feature allows the downloaded movie to play within a few seconds of the initiation of the download. The Convenience advantage rests with Netflix.

Pricing refers to the final cash payment the consumer makes to the seller of the product. Blockbuster has a two-part pricing scheme. In the first part, the company offers the set top box for $99, which includes 25 movie credits with the initial $99 purchase. In the second part of its pricing scheme, Blockbuster plans to charge $1.99 to $3.99 per movie. Netflix, on the other hand, is taking a very aggressive stance toward online downloading. It is piggybacking its online service on its existing DVD by mail service. In the cheapest version of its DVD by mail service, a consumer pays $8.99 per month. But with that payment, the Netflix consumer pays nothing extra for as many online videos as he cares to download in the month. Clearly, the Price advantage rests with Netflix.

Netflix has already proven that its fixed price per month pricing model is more attractive to consumers than is the video on-demand payment model that Blockbuster uses in its new online service and in its stores. Consumers clearly prefer the Netflix approach. So, why try the Blockbuster model again with this new online service?

In summary, Netflix wins on Function, Convenience and Price. Blockbuster wins on Reliability. In the new online service, as long as Reliability is acceptable, Netflix is the clear winner.

A Win Win Cost Reduction/Performance Innovation in the Cell Phone Industry

The cell phone carriers are about to introduce a product innovation, called a femtocell, to improve cell phone reception within a home. These femtocells are about the size of a toaster. The wireless carriers will install these mini cell phone towers. The tiny tower will connect with cell phones inside the consumer’s home through a broadband internet connection to the telephone network. The wireless carriers hope that this innovation will increase the reliability of the wireless system to the extent that the consumer will be able to get rid of the $50 a month average land line cost. The consumer will pay about $100 for the femtocell, plus ongoing monthly service fees for the “enhanced” telephone service. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Companies are trying to create upscale niches” on StrategyStreet.com.) This sounds like a pretty good deal for the consumer, assuming they can get rid of their land lines. The innovation should substantially reduce the customer’s telecommunications costs. (See the Perspective, “The Choice of New Products” on StrategyStreet.com.)

It is an even better deal for the wireless carriers. These carriers pay about $200 for each of these boxes. They will recoup that $200 through the $100 installation fee plus the ongoing “enhanced” service fees. The beauty of the technology is that it lets the wireless carriers shift some of the cost of an increase in wireless capacity to their consumer customers. The capacity addition helps the carriers avoid some of the costs of adding new and expensive transmission towers.

We have studied patterns of cost reduction for a number of years. Costs are Inputs of people, purchases or capital. These Inputs produce product Outputs. The cost reduction objective is to reduce the ratio of Inputs to Outputs. We have observed that there are four separate approaches to reducing costs:

- Reduce the rates the company pays for the use of an Input

- Reduce the number of units of Input that are wasted or idle in the production of the Output

- Redesign the product or the process to avoid activities or steps that are currently undertaken in the production of the Output

- Find new customers and sales volume, i.e. more Output, for fixed cost Inputs.

This femtocell innovation is an example of the third cost management technique: the redesign of a process to reduce activities. This particular redesign reduces the capital requirements in the industry by shifting activities and investments to the consumer for no compensation. In fact, in this case, the consumer pays for the shift directly.

This certainly looks like an attractive win win deal.

The Improve/Cost section of StrategyStreet.com contains several hundred brainstorming ideas to control costs in even the best of markets.

A Price Leader Enters the Performance Leader Market

Hyundai has announced that it will offer a luxury sedan in the U.S. market this Fall. The new model, the Genesis, purports to offer Lexus and BMW quality for a price 35% less than those competitors.

This is quite a leap for Hyundai. Its reputation in the domestic market is that of a Price Leader competitor selling primarily smaller cars. Its larger, Standard Leader, products, such as the Sonata, sell slowly in the U.S. (See the Perspective, “Why do Leaders Lead?” on StrategyStreet.com for more insight.)

The company is making a classic low-end competitor attack on this Performance Leader market. It does not claim to be as good as its competition, such as the BMW. It claims only that it is good enough to be compared to BMW and Lexus. In return, it offers a substantial discount. The company hopes to attract what it calls “non-conformist” consumers who appreciate luxury but are not concerned about the brand of luxury car they drive.

The Genesis offers all the bells and whistles of the luxury sedan category. The company is putting its warranty money where its quality mouth is. Its warranty, at five years or 60,000 miles, is far better than the four years or 50,000 miles more typical of the luxury market.

Hyundai expects that the new automobile will increase its market share and boost its brand image. If the new car is as good as its early reviews, it is likely to do both.

How the High End Company is Vulnerable

The housing market is in a shambles, especially the new home construction market. In partial response to this horrible market, some of the home building industry’s largest competitors, including Toll Brothers and Hovnanian Enterprises, have entered the custom home market. Their entry illustrates the strengths of companies at the high end and exposes their vulnerability.

In the custom home market, small builders design and build homes for customers who own their own lots. These customers go to these high end builders because of Function. The builders will design and build exactly what the customer wants. The Features and Functions of the home are precisely built to the customer’s specifications. (See “How Customers Buy” in StrategyStreet.com/Tools/Perspectives.) We call companies at the high end of the product spectrum Performance Leaders. These companies usually offer Functions that the industry’s largest competitors, whom we call Standard Leaders, do not offer. (See “Success Under Fire: Policies to Prosper in Hostile Times” in StrategyStreet.com/Tools/Perspectives.)

There is not much of a market for the Standard Leaders in home building today. New home construction rates are near historic lows. In search of some market, then, these Standard Leader builders have begun offering custom-built homes. There are two types of these homes: semi-custom homes, which are developed from the builders’ pre-drawn plans; and custom homes, which are built to the buyer’s specific specifications. The Standard Leaders are entering the Performance Leader’s territory with both semi-custom and custom homes.

Why would a custom home customer buy a Performance Leader product, such as a custom home, from a Standard Leader company? There are three answers to this question. The first answer is that the customer wants Reliability. These customers want to be sure that the project will be finished as promised. These Standard Leader builders have more resources available to them and have a proven capability to complete a project, where sometimes Performance Leader builders might falter. Second, the customers for the custom home buy on Convenience. Some of these customers have found that the Standard Leader builders can produce a custom home in half the time it takes for the Performance Leader builder to complete the project. Finally, these custom home customers also buy on Price. The economies of scale that the Standard Leader builders can bring to the Performance Leader product category enable them to offer lower prices, per square foot of home. In fact, these prices can be as much as 25% below those of the Performance Leader custom home prices.

Performance Leaders are usually strong on Function. But Standard Leaders can attack their market, offering better Reliability, Convenience and Price. The Standard Leaders’ high end product is “almost as good as” that of the Performance Leader company’s product, but it is much cheaper.

This Standard Leader attack from below pattern has recurred many times. Another example is the Lexus line of automobiles offered by Toyota. In the early years of Lexus’ debut, Toyota priced the Lexus at a breathtakingly low price compared to its competition from Mercedes and BMW, among others. This price advantage shot Lexus into the market. Today, the Lexus enjoys a much higher price level but it is still less expensive than BMW or Mercedes.

The Fate of Price Point Specialists in Hostility

As a market works its way through overcapacity and Hostility, the industry’s Price Point specialists come under extreme pressure.

Often, the low-end competitors, we call them Price Leaders, are squeezed out by the industry leaders, whom we call Standard Leaders, introducing low-end products to their product line. This pattern explains the demise of low-end automobile manufacturers, such as Yugo and American Motors. The high-end Price Point specialists, whom we call Performance Leaders, also tend to suffer. The industry Standard Leaders introduce more high-end products and pull enough volume from the Performance Leaders to cause them economic hardship.

Many of the Performance Leader companies are purchased by Standard Leaders over time. An example is Ford’s purchase of Volvo and Jaguar when Ford was still a strong Standard Leader. Today, the Japanese automobile manufacturers set the standards for the auto industry. They offer products at most price points, from Price Leader to Performance Leader, and present a strong challenge both to other Standard Leaders and to the remaining independent Performance Leaders in the automobile industry. (See “Why Do Leaders Lead?” in StrategyStreet.com/Tools/Perspectives.)

Even the airline industry is starting to see pressure on the Price Leaders caused by Standard Leader cost-cutting. Until recently, the Price Leaders in the industry, such as Jet Blue, Virgin America, Air Tran and even Southwest, had been protected by the onerous work rules that the unionized workforce imposed on the legacy carriers. But bankruptcy, or its threat, enabled the legacy carriers to reduce some of their cost disadvantages. Now even the best of the Price Leaders in the industry feel the sting of intense competition. At the other end of the price spectrum, no Performance Leader airline in the industry has survived more than a very few years during hostility. All are now gone.

Industry Leader Preempts the Low End of the Market

Recently, Intel announced the Atom chips. These chips are inexpensive, built for ultra-cheap desktop or portable computers called Nettops and Netbooks. The Atom chips for Nettops cost $29 each, while those for the Netbooks will sell for $44. These are both Price Leader products.

In our analyses of price points, we have identified four separate price points in the market place. (See: “Why Do Leaders Lead?” in StrategyStreet.com/Tools/Perspectives) Three of these price points appear in most markets:

• The Standard Leader price points are those that command the middle of the market. They set the standards for all products offered in the market.

• At the high-end of the market, the Performance Leader products occupy the premium-end of the market, with prices starting at 10% over the Standard Leader product. These products offer more performance in the form of Features, Reliability and Convenience than do the Standard Leader products in return for a much higher price.

• At the low-end of the market live the Price Leader products. These products offer fewer benefits, lower performance, than the Standard Leader products. Their prices must be much lower to make up for that. Most Price Leader products have prices at least 25% below those of the industry Standard Leaders.
  

These price point categories apply to both products and companies. For example, a Standard Leader company will often offer a Performance Leader product in addition to its Standard Leader products.

By introducing a Price Leader product, the Standard Leader company, Intel preempts the low-end of the market. Its main rival, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD), might have had an opportunity at that low-end but its unique opportunity has passed it by. AMD will inevitably introduce a Price Leader product in order to continue offering a broad product line, but it will probably not gain much market share from the introduction.

In an unusual move, Intel is ahead of its major customers on this product. Hewlett-Packard and Dell, the two leading U.S. producers of personal computers, had yet to introduce their full lines of Nettops and Netbooks. Instead, some of the industry’s followers dominate these Price Leader computers.

Intel read the tea leaves correctly. Congratulations on an astute innovation.