Constrictions in Components Supply Support Higher Prices

Years ago we were doing some work in the roofing business. In one study, we were working on the asphalt shingle roofing manufacturing business. At the time, this was a terrible business. Returns were low, growth rates were modest, at best, and there was a good deal of overcapacity in the industry. Then the industry caught a break. A shortage in asphalt developed. This shortage of asphalt rolled through the asphalt shingle plants and restricted their output. Immediately, prices jumped, returns became attractive and industry participants breathed a sigh of relief. Unfortunately, this asphalt shortage did not last very long. The industry shortly returned to its previous hostile condition. (See the Perspective, “What Ends Hostility?” on StrategyStreet.com.)

A shortage in any component, or labor, will restrict industry capacity and tend to raise prices. A labor shortage is, in part, responsible for some of the high prices in mining today. Miners work in areas that are often hard to reach. They also are skilled employees. The run-up in commodity prices, especially those related to ores such as silver, gold and copper, has increased the demand for these skilled miners. In addition, the mining industry faces competition for skilled workers from the oil and natural gas industries, which are also growing.

Mining companies are now going to great lengths to attract and retain these skilled workers. Some of these miners are now earning 25% more in compensation than they were a year ago. Some companies are flying workers to and from remote mines. For example, BHP Billiton plans to fly 500 workers from Brisbane, about 500 miles away, to a coal mine site that they are opening and then fly them back home after a couple of weeks.

If this commodity boom continues, the industry’s total capacity will be determined more by labor availability than by its more traditional measures of capacity. (See “Audio Tip #117: Capacity Constraints and Pricing” on StrategyStreet.com.)

Direct Edge: A Transformer Next Leader Product

A Next Leader competitor is in an extremely fortunate position. A Next Leader is a competitor or product that offers much better than industry standard performance for a low price to a specific subset of industry customers. While offering better benefits to some customers, it may reduce benefits for others. But all Next Leaders offer low prices. The Next Leader can do this because it has a very low cost structure. (See “Video #22: Definition of Next Leaders” on StrategyStreet.com.) Next Leaders do not appear in many industries. When they do appear, they can change an industry, whether the industry is in manufacturing, retail or service. For example, Toys R Us invented the Toy Retailing Category Killer, a Next Leader product. Home Depot has done much the same in hardware retailing. Other Next Leaders include the early Apple personal computer, Intuit personal financial management software, Jiffy Lube in auto services and Domino’s Pizza.

We have studied many Next Leader competitors. Our study has suggested there are two kinds of Next Leaders products: Reformers and Transformers. A Reformer product is a type of Next Leader that reduces the benefits for the user while increasing benefits for the buyer, compared to the industry’s Standard Leader product. Jiffy Lube and Domino’s Pizza would both be Reformer Next Leader competitors. The second type of Next Leader competitor, Transformer products and companies, increase the benefits for the user of the product but offers, at least initially, fewer buyer benefits than the Standard Leader product. Toys R Us and Home Depot are two examples of Transformer Next Leader competitors.

Direct Edge is an example of a Transformer competitor. It offers its customers very fast securities trading on virtually any platform, from computers to smart phones. It is a young electronic stock exchange and it is having a big impact on securities trading. Its first noticeable impact is in market share. As recently as five years ago, the New York Stock Exchange accounted for 70% or more of the trading in the stocks listed on its exchange. Today, the stock exchange handles 36% of those trades. (See “Audio Tip #85: Evaluate the Company's Success in Penetrating each Price Point in the Market” on StrategyStreet.com.) Twelve other public exchanges, several electronic trading platforms and many “dark pools” command the rest of the market share in NYSE listed stocks.

Direct Edge came into existence during 2010. Several brokerage firms and other financial players formed Direct Edge to offer a counter veiling power to the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. Direct Edge now owns 10% of stock trading in the United States.

Direct Edge is not only big and fast-growing, but inexpensive as well. It has ready access to the share trading of its brokerage house and hedge fund owners. It operates many banks of state-of-the-art computers in warehouse-type facilities in New Jersey rather than in more-expensive New York. And, despite its size, it has fewer than one hundred employees.

The evolution of these non-traditional exchanges has resulted in declining trading costs and much faster trading times for all customers. Next Leaders do that.

The iPhone Versus the iPhone

After nearly four years, AT&T has lost its exclusivity on Apple’s iPhone. It has been a great run. Now AT&T faces the formidable competition of Verizon, who started offering the iPhone in February of 2011. Market shares are about to shift. Let’s look at how they might change.

Market shares among established customers shift for one of two reasons. (See Audio Tip #40: The Components of Market Share Change" on StrategyStreet.com.) First, a competitor may “win” market share by offering a benefit that more than half of the market suppliers do not offer. On the other hand, market share may shift away from a competitor if it “fails” its customer relationship and opens that relationship to other competitors. A company “fails” a customer relationship when it refuses, or is unable, to offer something that half the other competitors in the market can or will offer.

AT&T garnered much of its share gain over the last four years with a “win.” That “win” was due to its exclusive offering of the Apple iPhone. While it won business with the iPhone, it developed a reputation for problems in the quality of its services. iPhone users tended to overwhelm the AT&T network and cause interruptions and dropped phone calls. AT&T’s customer service has been suspect as well. Still, its market share has grown with the iPhone, primarily at the expense of the smaller carriers. Its market share growth due to the exclusive on the iPhone offset its “failures” in its network and customer service.

Now Verizon enters with its own version of the iPhone. Today, any customer who wants an iPhone can choose either the largest competitor in the market, Verizon, or the second largest competitor, AT&T as his or her carrier. So, Verizon can “win” market share against the smaller competitors as well. These competitors, such as Sprint, Virgin Mobile and others like them, do not offer the iPhone and are unlikely to do so soon.

Verizon should also be able to gain share at the expense of AT&T. Here’s how. iPhone-using customers who are dissatisfied with their current service with AT&T now have a viable, high quality competitor offering an equivalent service with the same phone. Some of these customers will leave AT&T because they perceive that AT&T’s services are not up to the standard of the other competitors, especially Verizon’s, and migrate to Verizon. This is a phenomenon we call “flight to quality.” This “flight to quality” is also an example of a “weak win,” where a competitor gains share only after an incumbent supplier has “failed” the customer relationship.

This “flight to quality” is unlikely to be dramatic. A company can “win” share quickly with a unique Function. On the other hand, a “flight to quality” usually brings share gains in dribs and drabs. It produces share gains slowly, over time, because of inertia in the customer relationships. This inertia allows AT&T time to get its house in order before it suffers a great deal of customer immigration. (See Video #36: Probable Priorities for Innovation in Hostile Markets on StrategyStreet.com.)

The Price Can Go to Zero

For many years, the fees charged by investment managers of mutual funds grew ever so slightly, gradually approaching 1.5%. Over the last few years, though, the growth in these management fees has stopped. In fact, it reversed. Last year the average management fee charged for actively managed mutual funds was 1.38%, or 138 basis points, where a basis point is one tenth of one percent. But that average is badly misleading. It’s misleading because it treats all funds, regardless of size, as the same. When you adjust the fees for the size of the funds, you find that the dollar-weighted average for actively managed funds is now below 100 basis points. Three things have caused this reversal in management fees: low returns in the stock market, the growth of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and a price war among the biggest players in the market.

The first two of these factors need little explanation. Over the last ten years, an investment in many bond funds out-performed an investment in diversified equity funds. These low returns have many investors focusing on the costs they incur for the management of their money. These costs include transaction fees for trading securities and management fees for the companies managing mutual funds or exchanged-traded funds. The second factor, the growth of ETFs, is somewhat less obvious, but important. ETFs have garnered a significant share of new money invested in equity funds over the last few years. Companies managing ETFs charge low fees for managing these funds because they have very low costs for shareholder servicing and some other administrative functions associated with investment management. Shrewd mutual fund managers have reduced prices in order to manage the gap in pricing they allow for their managed mutual funds compared to comparable ETFs.

These two causes of the fall in prices for investment management now have a third important factor. This third factor may turn out to be the most important of all. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The industry is seeing its first price wars” on StrategyStreet.com.) As described in other blogs (see blogs HERE and HERE), Vanguard has started, and continued, a price war in the ETF market. For example, iShare’s MSCI Emerging Market’s ETF and Vanguard’s Emerging Market’s ETF compete directly. Vanguard’s fund charges 27 basis points. The iShare’s fund charges 69 basis points. The iShare’s fund entered the market well before the Vanguard fund, and was much larger than the Vanguard fund. However, during 2010, the Vanguard ETF added $18 billion to its fund while iShare’s added about $4 billion. Price matters among peers.

The iShare’s funds are not always market share losers, however. The iShare’s Gold Trust is an ETF that competes with a larger rival, SPDR Gold Trust. Until June of last year, both of these ETFs charged 40 basis points. In June, iShares cut its management fees to 25 basis points. SPDR Gold Trust stayed pat at 40 basis points. Over the next few months, the iShare’s fund gained $875 million in new money, while the SPDR Gold Trust saw a net loss of $1.2 billion of money under management. Price matters among peers.

These management fees can even go to zero. One ETF today has no management fee, zero. It gets its revenues by lending out the securities in its portfolio. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Technology improvements bring falling prices” on StrategyStreet.com.)

Of course, as companies engage in price wars, they advertise their lower prices extensively in order to capture as much market share as possible before their competitors respond. The result: customers are becoming ever more price sensitive about the management fees they pay, simply because the management companies tell them to be more sensitive.

How long will it be until this fee warfare spreads to other smaller types of ETFs? Not very long, as long as price moves share.

Evolution of the Smart Phone Market

The smart phone market is growing at a very fast pace. The number of smart phones sold world-wide is expected to grow at a pace of more than 15% a year. This is what we call a Developing market. The smart phone market portrays some interesting developments you might expect to see in other fast-growing markets.

Apple really made the market take flight with its original iPhone. Apple has migrated into the high-end, Performance Leader, part of the market with its iPhone4, selling for $199 with a two year contract. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The industry leaders are losing share” on StrategyStreet.com.) Wisely, Apple kept its old iPhone3 GS on the market as a lower-cost product, selling for $99 with a two year contract.

Competitors have been stumped trying to outflank Apple with new and better functionality. Apple simply has too many apps for most competitors. Only the Android phones, using the Google operating system, have gained share. Nokia and Research In Motion have both lost substantial share in the smart phone market. So, what are the competitors to do? (See the Symptom & Implication, “Competitors in formerly underdeveloped markets have begun meeting one another” on StrategyStreet.com.)

In this market, as in other Developing markets, the competitors strip out some of the expensive benefits of the product and introduce a new lower Price Point. In the smart phone market, the new lower Price Point still delivers one of the most important benefits of a smart phone, internet access. Because these new Price Points have fewer benefits, they cost less and allow the companies to sell to the carriers at lower prices than the Apple i4 product. (See the Symptom & Implication, “Low end products are gaining share of the market” on StrategyStreet.com.) In turn, the wireless service carriers offer lower priced package deals to their users when the packages include the new lower-priced smart phones.

Two developments are of note here. First, the evolution of the market. In this case, as in others, the market develops a new lower Price Point product that satisfies some of the basic needs of the current customer group. More importantly, the new Price Point attracts a new cohort of customers due to its lower prices. Second, prices decline in the market despite the fact that the market is growing very quickly. Prices are declining because costs are going down. Yes. But they are also declining under the press of competition in a market where margins are high enough to sustain lower prices with still-acceptable margins. Virtually all fast growing markets witness falling prices.

Best Buy in a Leader's Trap

Few industry leaders believe their prices are too high. Often, they are right. They are usually less right in a market where prices fall. Consider GM in automobiles and IBM in personal computers in the past. At one time or another, most industry leaders will get caught in a Leader’s Trap, where they assume that customers will stay loyal to their products because the low-end products do not enjoy their quality and reputation. This assumption rarely, if ever, holds. Best Buy has been in a Leader’s Trap and its assumptions won’t hold this time either.

Through the third quarter of 2009, Best Buy was gaining market share in flat panel TVs and personal computers. However, in the most recent quarter of 2010, the company lost over 1% of its market share in televisions and computers to competitors who were discounting. (See the Perspective, “The Two Best Consultants in the World” on StrategyStreet.com.) Now, if it were just a simple low-end, low value competitor, Best Buy might not worry. But their discounting competition was Wal-Mart and Amazon. By any definition, these companies would count as peers of Best Buy in the television and personal computer retail market.

In the recent quarter, Best Buy emphasized high technology, and high margined, TV and personal computer products. Customers did not follow along. Best Buy noted that it had faced tough competition from off brand televisions at lower price points.

Best Buy could have offered private label products to compete with low-end, off brand, competitors. Its store brands include Dynex and Insignia. The company decided not to emphasize these lower-priced products in their promotions because they have low profit margins. Best Buy “failed” its customer by refusing to offer something that at least half the other competitors could and would offer. (See “Audio Tip #35: How Does a Company “Fail” in a Market?” on StrategyStreet.com.) Nor did competition “win” the customers who switched. Amazon and Wal-Mart simply took what Best Buy allowed them to take. (See “Audio Tip #34: How Does a Company “Win” in a Market?” on StrategyStreet.com.)

The result: Best Buy missed its targets and saw its stock price fall by 15%. The company lost market share to peer competitors. And its sales and profits fell in televisions and personal computers. Competitors gained strength.

Best Buy is a fine company with capable management. It won’t stay down for long. You may expect to see them leave the Leader’s Trap very soon.

A Very Rare Form of Pricing

Recently, Continental Airlines introduced a new service called “FareLock.” This new service gives travelers three days, or a week, to decide whether to buy a ticket and avoid a fare increase or the risk that the passenger’s flight will sell out. In return, Continental plans to charge a flat fee of $5 for a three day hold and $9 for a one week hold. Continental is offering its passengers a Call. For a fee, the passenger has the right to buy the ticket at today’s price for a few days into the future. This is a very rare form of pricing outside of the securities market.

Every price has at least three components. Most have four. (See “Audio Tip #113: Tools to Change Pricing” on StrategyStreet.com.) The first of these components is the benefit package that the price offers. The second is the basis of charge, that is, how the company quantifies in currency what it charges for a unit of the product. The units can be a package, an individual item, a unit of time, and so forth. The third component is the list price of the product. Virtually all products also have what we call optional components, the fourth component. These optional components may, but do not have to, be a part of the product price. Optional price components include various discounts, fees, coupons and other methods of conveying a change in effective price, either an increase or a decrease, to the customer. A Call is one of the optional components of price. It occurs only rarely.

Here are some other examples:

* Some colleges have used the Call in the form of a fixed tuition price for any student returning for the four years of the student’s education. This pricing mechanism increases the college’s retention rates. (See “Audio Tip #142: Defensive Pricing Guidelines” on StrategyStreet.com.)

* There are also contingent Calls. Waterford Development Corporation was dealing with a difficult real estate market. It offered to have homes re-appraised two years after the date the transaction closed. If, after two years, the price of the home dropped, the company promised to write the buyer a check for up to 15% of the original sales price. With this Call, the customer gained the right to live in the house and yet pay a lower effective price for the house if the market should decline in the next two years. (See “Audio Tip #151: Changing Performance and Price Together” on StrategyStreet.com.)

* A discount broker, in an effort to attract more high-volume traders, offered a Call. This broker charged the customer only a single commission for multiple trades of the same stock on the same side of the market on the same day.