News Corp Responds to the Market for “Free”

The newspaper industry has faced a mighty challenge over the last few years. There is so much “free” content to complete with them. Newspaper revenue continues to plummet. Internet users are reluctant to pay for content. All the free content, supported by advertising revenue, has decimated the newspaper industry. The industry’s cousin, the magazine industry, is not far behind.

This trend can’t continue forever. Already, many people are asking themselves how much they can trust the information on the internet. The need for Reliability drives the demand for Snopes.com. How many “free” web sites can earn enough from advertising to pay all their bills? An effective industry answer to “free” may be forthcoming in the News Corp online newspaper called “The Daily.” The Daily will cover general news, sports, arts and opinion in a format dedicated to the Apple iPad. In addition to the written content, the product will carry high definition video and 360 degree photos. The same product will be available in a few months for the Android-based tablet computers.

The Daily will sell for $.99 a week, or $39.99 a year, a very low price compared to newspapers. With this model, the product receives revenues both from the subscribers and from advertisers. Subscribers have the Reliability benefit of knowing that the content producer cares about facts, accuracy and readable writing style. Advertisers pay for eyeballs that follow a Reliable product.

The Daily is what we call a Next Leader product. This is a product that offers much better than industry standard performance for a low price to a specific subset of industry customers. The Next Leader can offer the very low price because it has a much lower cost structure than is typical in the industry. There are two basic types of Next Leaders. The first are Reformer products. This type of Next Leader product reduces the benefits for the user (usually Function benefits) while increasing the benefits for the buyer (usually Reliability and Convenience benefits) compared to the industry Standard Leader product. The second of the two types of Next Leader products are Transformer products. These products increase the benefits of the user but offer, at least initially, fewer benefits to the buyer than the Standard Leader product offers. The Daily is a Reformer product. It offers the Convenience of formatting fit for a tablet computer so it provides easier access for a segment of the industry’s customers. Its low cost structure results from its elimination of printing presses and distribution costs.

If this new tablet-based product offers a quality read, it will hasten the day when virtually every newspaper and magazine is offered first online and only secondarily in hard copy. The online versions will come at a fraction of the cost of the hard copy versions. Readership is certain to grow.

The Long and Arduous Journey of the Airline Industry May be Reaching an End

The government deregulated the airline industry in 1978. Since that time, the basic pricing in the industry, as well as airline fortunes, have been more or less continuously on the downward slope. It has been a very long trip down.

The industry may be heading up again, though. In the third quarter of 2010, the average domestic airfare was 11% higher than a year earlier. Profits returned to the industry in 2010 behind higher prices. In some part, these higher prices were the result of the additional fees that most of the domestic carriers charged passengers for checked baggage, better seating, rerouting and so forth. Still, the industry was able to hold its higher prices.

These prices are holding because the major industry players are less enamored of discounted flying. All of the big airlines are finding ways to extract prices from industry customers. Now that airline capacity utilization is high, the industry is more careful about capacity additions. Higher prices are here to stay.

The consumer still is far ahead. Even at these higher prices, ticket prices are a bargain. In fact, ticket prices, adjusted for inflation, are 20% below the levels of 1995. The industry has continuously stripped benefits from the base product in order to save costs. In 2010, the industry added back a few of those benefits (for example, economy plus seating) for an additional charge. We may see more of that over the next few years.

The Advent of the F-commerce Evolution

Don’t look now, but we are entering the world of F-commerce. What is that, those of you older than thirty will ask? F-commerce is selling through a Facebook page.

The trend is early yet, but likely to turn into a stampede. JC Penney and 1-800-Flowers.com both have established full E-commerce stores within their Facebook page. The stores include check-out and other features you typically find on an E-commerce web site. Facebook claims that twenty-five of the largest retail sites are already integrated with Facebook, as are seventeen of the twenty-five fastest growing retail sites.

Think of Facebook as a virtual mall. There are all kinds of people wandering around there, talking to one another. Facebook offers a nice opportunity for a company to interact with customers and allow them to bring their friends into the conversation to evaluate styles and colors and so forth. If a company integrates its storefront with the Facebook page, its Facebook “friends” will never have to leave the virtual mall in order to purchase. This is an important product innovation.

Product innovations reduce customers’ effective costs in one of three ways: add information about the product and how it is to be used, reduce the resources the customer must use with the product, or improve the customer’s experience with the product.

This innovation improves the customer’s experience with the product by increasing the customer’s sense of security in using the product. It allows the customer to get her friends’ opinions on what she is purchasing. Secondarily, the Facebook store reduces the customer’s resources used with the product by reducing the time the customer must spend in using the product. The innovation reduces the steps the customer must take to make a purchase and it places the company’s product closer to the customer’s location.

This is going to be a train to the destination of millions of customers. Every mainstream retailer has to get on board.

Cost Reduction by Redesigning the Product

Over the last several years, we have studied many examples of cost reduction initiatives to improve productivity and create economies of scale. In simplest terms, there are four actions that improve productivity and economies of scale. First, reduce the rate of cost you pay for an input. Second, reduce the inputs that do not produce output. Third, reduce unique activities or components in products and processes by redesigning the products and processes. Fourth, spread fixed cost activities over new product output. The cellular telephone carriers are introducing measures to reduce their costs by redesigning the product.

The wireless carriers use cellular towers to broadcast their signals. The cellular product design offers signals traveling long distances, primarily for voice and for relatively low data speeds. A cellular tower is expensive but capable of sending a signal for several miles.

This cellular technology worked well until the evolution of the smart phone. The growth of the smart phone has put very high demands on the cellular tower infrastructure because of the heavy data usage it brings to the market. Since 2010, data has taken over the majority of network traffic from voice communications. Now the carriers and, in particular, AT&T with its Apple iPhones, is having difficulty keeping up with the growth in demand.

AT&T today and, likely a few others in the future, has found a potential innovative solution, adding Wi Fi access points. These Wi Fi access points are ideal for heavy data traffic sent at high speeds over relatively short distances. Wi Fi access points transmit signals over a few hundred feet. The Wi Fi access points are smaller, easier and cheaper to install than are cellular towers. This low-cost approach appears to make sense in areas with high density of users. AT&T has placed them in New York’s Time Square and Rockefeller Center, in downtown Charlotte, North Carolina, in neighborhoods surrounding Chicago’s Wrigley Field and in San Francisco’s Embarcadero Center.

But there are some drawbacks to Wi Fi access points. Sometimes, a user has to take several steps to connect to a Wi Fi access point. Signals from the Wi Fi access points may interfere with one another, if signals come from multiple networks. Some smart phones do not have Wi Fi capability. These disadvantages have, so far, held back Verizon Wireless’s adoption of this apparently low-cost approach to providing service.

AT&T is leading this cost-saving innovation experiment. Their network strains force it to be creative and experimental. AT&T saves costs by redesigning the product itself using a less expensive technology with some shortcomings. If the AT&T experiment proves both cost effective and acceptable to cellular customers, every other wireless carrier will be forced to adopt it. And since a Wi Fi access point is largely a fixed cost, the wireless carriers with the highest density of membership within the Wi Fi area will have the lowest cost per unit. In most areas of the country that is likely to be either Verizon or AT&T. They will end up getting a unit cost advantage over their smaller competitors…if this works.

The Japanese Pay the Price

The figures are in for U.S. auto sales in 2010. The biggest winners in percentage growth were Hyundai, at 24%, and Ford at 20%. Toyota lost .4% and Honda grew a mediocre 7%. The Japanese struggled in 2010.

Earlier we wrote a blog about Ford’s ascendency and Toyota’s problems (see Blog HERE). Toyota is paying the price for failing its customers. Honda appears to be getting painted with the “failure” brush, though I doubt its punishment is deserved.

I am actually using the word “fail” to mean something specific here. A company fails its customers when it is unable or unwilling to do something that at least half of its competitors can, or will, do for customers. Toyota’s troubles with accelerators, floor mats, and so forth, received extensive media coverage. This coverage clearly has had a negative impact on Toyota this year.

Toyota’s struggles illustrate the win and fail dynamic. In our terms, a “win” occurs when a company is able to do something that the majority of its competitors either can not or will not do. Wins account for a good deal of market share growth in a fast-growing market, but are less important in more mature markets. In a more mature Stable market and, especially, in all Hostile markets, failure moves a significant amount of market share.

Here is what this means. The decision to change a supplier is really two decisions. The first is the decision to leave a current supplier and the second is the decision on which new supplier to take on in your relationship. In the average Stable and Hostile marketplace, more market share moves on failure than on wins. This means that before an established customer will change suppliers, its current incumbent supplier must “fail” the relationship in some way. This failure, then, opens up the customer’s relationship to competition among other potential suppliers. Whichever supplier gains this customer’s volume really did so only after the incumbent failed. We call this gain a “weak win.” The “weak win” would not have happened on a straight-up comparison of performance and price of the new supplier versus the old. The gain only happened after the incumbent clearly failed the customer and then opened the relationship to someone new.

Toyota’s failure was largely a failure of Reliability. It clearly lost share. The companies that gained this share from Toyota, Ford and Hyundai among them, enjoyed some degree of a “weak win” in the domestic automobile market. They may have “won” market share as well, but my guess is that most of their share gains from Toyota fell to them from Toyota’s “failure.”

But Can You Control Other Entrants?

The United Autoworkers (UAW) is on a new campaign. The union plans to organize workers in hither-to non-union foreign-owned automobile plants in the United States. This campaign may or may not work, but in the long run it will prove futile unless the union can compete in the international market, against all international auto workers.

There are 575,000 autoworkers in the U.S. Nearly 20% work for foreign-owned plants. All of these plants are non-union. The foreign-owned plants were intentionally placed in right-to-work areas, many in the South.

The UAW is likely to have some difficulty succeeding with this campaign. The non-union workers already earn highly competitive wages and benefits. To date, these U.S. workers in plants owned by Toyota, Volkswagen, Hyundai and Honda have shown little interest in unionization.

Why would the union be so interested in this initiative? To preserve its membership. The traditional problem with unions is less the rate of wages they demand and more about the work rules they impose. These work rules reduce the productivity of the unionized plants. That has certainly been the case in the U.S. auto industry. As a result, the UAW is losing membership as UAW auto plants in the U.S. close under the onerous costs the UAW plants carry. If the union can succeed in unionizing the domestic foreign-owned auto plants to the same extent they have unionized the domestic manufacturers’ plants, they will be able to impose the same work rules and produce roughly the same productivity. The result should, in the union’s eyes, be a reduction in the rate of jobs lost in the union.

But there is a problem here. The UAW has already seen that it was unable to stop new non-union plants in the U.S. How will it stop future non-union domestic plants? O.K., let’s say they can do that. Will they also be able to stop all foreign non-union plants from becoming established and growing? Certainly not. Unless the union membership can compete on an international basis with competitive costs and productivity, this unionization effort is wasted money. If it succeeds, the U.S. loses more plants to plants located offshore. Union membership still falls.

It seems that one of the problems for unionized employees is one of definition. Union members often call their compatriots in competing companies “brothers and sisters.” These are certainly not brothers and sisters. In a marketplace they are competitors. Union employees have to be able to beat, or at least stalemate, these competitors or lose their jobs. This is true as long as the UAW can not control the entrance of other less expensive competitors, either in the U.S. or elsewhere.

The long history of the DRAM semiconductor market illustrates this. The U.S. manufacturers of DRAM semiconductors faced intense competition from the Japanese in the 1980s. The domestic industry succeeded in slowing the Japanese by using the International Trade Commission. Then arose new and equally troublesome problems. These problems were DRAM semiconductor facilities in Taiwan and Korea. Eventually, the U.S. industry evolved to the point where it had only one domestic producer of DRAM chips. Intel was one of the early competitors to get out of that market to focus its resources in the more complex, and much more profitable, domestic micro-processor business. SX4MBURBCAJQ

Apple Gets Crossways with App Developers

Recently, Apple rejected a digital book application from Sony. The disagreement here is over how and when Apple collects for its services. Apple is playing a dangerous game.

In theory, Apple has the right to insist, under its terms for developers, that any app, which offers customers the ability to purchase books outside of the app, offer the ability for customers to purchase within the app at the same time.

Here is the rub. In its application, Sony sends customers to its own web site where they complete the purchase of a book. By routing the customers to its own web site, Sony is able to avoid a payment of 30% of revenues to Apple.

Others, including Amazon, with its Kindle, and Barnes & Noble, with its Nook, have been able to sell e-books by sending users to the companys’ own web sites. Apple simply was not enforcing its policy requiring developers to use its in-app purchasing feature to buy new content.

A 30% charge on revenues is a high price to pay Apple. Apple may be setting itself up for future loss of market share by enforcing this policy. If the Android platform does not put the same requirement on its app developers, the developers will have a strong incentive to avoid the 30% charge by encouraging customers to purchase using an Android device rather than an Apple device. Alternatively, the application developers may charge a higher price for purchases through Apple.

Apple’s unique strength has been its superior list of available applications. Apple’s enforcement of this requirement to purchase inside the app so that Apple can collect 30% of the revenues puts at risk its major advantage. Apple needs to compromise here by charging a lower price or no price at all. After all, it already makes high profits on its hardware and software product combination. It also makes profits on many of the downloaded apps. The application developers are customers too. Why make their life difficult? Does the benefit Apple provides a seller justify 30% of revenues? Sounds pretty rich.