Showing posts with label Target. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Target. Show all posts

Monday, November 1, 2010

Dominick’s Finds a Way to Reduce Price…Successfully

Dominick’s is a wholly owned unit of Safeway, the large retail grocer. They have found a way to use price to gain share in a highly competitive price environment.

If a company wishes to use a discounted price to gain market share, it must assure itself that its competitors will not copy its price reduction. If a competitor copies the price reduction, then the original company’s discount is no longer distinctive and cannot drive a gain in share. Instead, its low prices cause its margins to fall without the offsetting benefit of increased sales volume.

You would like to be able to predict whether a competitor will copy a discount you offer. In the course of many pricing studies, we have found that the likelihood of a competitor responding to a company’s price reduction depends on three factors: the competitor’s knowledge of the price reduction, the company’s capacity to meet that price reduction and, often most importantly, the competitor’s will to meet the lower price. (See “Diagnose/Pricing/Competition and Their Knowledge, Capability and Will” on StrategyStreet.com.)

If your competitor does not know about your price reduction, they can not respond in kind. In some markets, customers do not “shop” a lower price offering to their suppliers in what’s called “last look” Their suppliers may not respond to a competitor’s lower price offering because they do not know of it. The competitor also must have the capacity to respond to the lower price. In the vast majority of falling price environments, most competitors have ample capacity to respond to lower prices. Still, some competitors are unwilling to meet falling prices in an industry. These competitors are in a Leader’s Trap, where they assume that the lower prices will not attract their customers. This is virtually always a losing assumption. The phenomenon of the Leader’s Trap leads us to the third determinant of the likelihood that a competitor will respond to a lower price: does the competitor have the will to do so. A competitor needs the will to do so because its margins are likely to fall, even if it maintains its current market share. Some competitors refuse to suffer the margin consequences and live, at least for a time, in a Leader’s Trap. (See many examples on StrategyStreet/Tools/Grossary/Leader’s Trap)

So, it is difficult for a company to use a low price to gain market share. Difficult, but not impossible. Dominick’s has found a way. Dominick’s is in a price war, not only with traditional grocers, but also with Wal-Mart, Target and discount stores. These competitors of Dominick’s often have lower prices on categories of consumer purchases that Dominick’s would like to sell to their own customers.

Dominick’s has used its “Frequent Shopper Card” information to help it offer low prices to very targeted customers. It analyzed the shopping patterns of its frequent shoppers. It found that some of its customers have assumed that supermarkets are not competitive in some high-priced, high-margin products. These customers then start buying those categories from discount chains and spending their retail grocery money on perishables like milk, meat and produce. Dominick’s used this information to offer shoppers personalized savings on items they have purchased in the past and could purchase again. The store offers these shoppers very competitive discounts on products, which are profitable for Dominick’s, but that customers purchase from other competitors. The shopper is offered a very good deal. The offer comes automatically at the cash register when shoppers use their loyalty cards. The offers are good for up to ninety days on unlimited quantities of the discounted items.

Dominick’s is gaining share with this program because competitors do not have the knowledge of the lower prices. These low prices are not advertised, nor are they available to all shoppers. Instead, they are personalized offers, targeted at customers who are likely to use them soon. These same customers tend to buy these discounted products from other suppliers, assuming that Dominick’s is not price competitive with those other suppliers. Dominick’s picks up some extra sales that pay for the selective discounts it offers and competitors are unable to respond because they do not know about the discounts.

Monday, August 9, 2010

Pricing in Easy Industries

Here is an example where relatively small differences in price, in normally easy industries, have a big effect in the market.

PepsiCo owns Lifewater. Over the last year, Lifewater’s sales have risen by 85%, while overall sales of bottled water have fallen by 5%. Coca-Cola owns a Lifewater competitor named Vitaminwater. During the same period, Vitaminwater saw its market share shrink.

PepsiCo has been paying more attention to Lifewater. It redesigned its bottle and introduced a no-calorie version of the drink. It also changed its advertising emphasis.

But pricing has certainly played a role in the marketplace. As the recession began to take hold, PepsiCo shaved four cents off the price of Lifewater (see “Audio Tip #106: How do we Predict Competitor Responses to our Price Moves?”), dropping it to an average of $1.18. Vitaminwater chose the opposite approach. It raised its prices by 4%. This produced a 7% swing in price difference between Vitaminwater and Lifewater. This price change meant Lifewater appealed better to both consumers and the channel of distribution. Lifewater used the lower price to increase its retail presence, especially with Target stores. This created greater Convenience for the Lifewater consumer. Overall, Lifewater’s market share increased by 1.6 share points to 3.8%. (See “Audio Tip #45: The Components of Positive Volatility” on StrategyStreet.com.) Vitaminwater’s share dropped from 14% to 11.4%. (See “Audio Tip #46: The Components of Negative Volatility” on StrategyStreet.com.)

Pricing and price differences are never irrelevant. Customers are loath to pay higher prices for products that otherwise seem Functionally comparable.

Monday, May 24, 2010

Convenience and Reliability Innovations in a Fast-Growing Market

In a rapidly growing market, one growing faster than 15% a year in units, Function innovations tend to dominate market share movement. That is, Function innovations move more market share, on average, than do innovations in Reliability and Convenience. Often, the second major driver of market share movement in a fast-growing market is Price. Low prices and low-end competition often expand the market and cause significant market share shifts at the same time.

That is not to say that there aren’t Reliability and Convenience innovations. There are. The electronic reader market offers illustrations of these innovations. Barnes & Noble has an electronic reader called the Nook. This electronic reader is lagging in the market today, especially against the Amazon Kindle and the Apple iPad. To build awareness for its Nook product, Barnes & Noble has returned to T.V. advertising for the first time in several years. It wants to distinguish itself in the babble of noise from the many emerging eReaders and Tablets.

Advertising is both a Convenience and a Reliability innovation. It’s a Convenience innovation in that it helps the customer think of the product and know where to look for it. (See “Audio Tip #92: How Do We Add Knowledge to the Customer?” on StrategyStreet.com.) Advertising is also often a Reliability innovation because advertised products have stronger brand names and the aura of Reliability among consumers in a market. So advertising for Barnes & Noble should help the Nook gain some traction in the market. Will it be enough to overcome its laggard status? Probably not, due to its limited Function benefits in the form of attractive book titles. (See “Audio Tip #64: The Objectives of a Performance Improvement Program” on StrategyStreet.com.)

The leader in the market, Amazon’s Kindle, is also innovating its product in the form of Convenience. In the past, Amazon sold the Kindle only through its Amazon.com web site. This policy was in keeping with Amazon’s effort to get consumers of all products to purchase online, rather than through bricks-and-mortar retailers. Amazon has thought the better of this policy, though, with the advent of the Apple iPad. In part as a response to the availability of the iPad in Apple’s stores, Amazon has allowed Target to begin offering the Kindle at Target stores. Offering the product at Target is primarily a Convenience innovation. A customer can pick up the product faster at a Target store than by ordering online. In some ways, it is also a Reliability innovation. The customers can hold the product in their hands and see how the product works. Primarily, though, this is a Convenience innovation. Its main benefit for Amazon will be to prevent some loss of customer market share to a more Convenient iPad product. (See “Audio Tip #93: How Do We Reduce the Resources Used With Our Product?” on StrategyStreet.com.)