After months of back and forth, Kraft Foods has now reached a firm agreement to buy Cadbury. This may be a good thing for Kraft. Warren Buffett demurs due to the price. The jury is out. However, this merger may not be good for some of the other competitors in the industry. (See the Symptom & Implication, “The industry is consolidating through mergers and acquisitions” on StrategyStreet.com.) In particular, some industry observers are pointing to the precarious position of Hershey. They note that Hershey will be a very small competitor in the global confectionary business. That may be, but I would not be so fast to write off Hershey’s chances of survival. Often the smaller firms are more profitable than the largest firms in the industry.
A few years ago, we analyzed 240 industries that had five or more competitors reporting line of business sales of at least $50 million. (See the Perspective, “Is Bigger Really Better” on StrategyStreet.com.) In each of these industries, we studied the top four competitors measured in sales. We evaluated their market shares and their returns, looking for the benefits of natural economies of scale.
We calculated the percentage of time that a company ranked first in market share was also the leader in pre-tax return on assets. Pure chance would have seen the industry’s market share leader lead in returns 25% of the time. We found some economies of scale at work. In all of the 240 industries, we saw that the industry market share leader led the industry in returns on assets 29% of the time, only 4% more than random chance.
Surprisingly, the distant followers can sometimes be powerful competitors. In our study, the competitor ranking fourth in market share led its industry in returns 23% of the time, only 2% less than the 25% random chance.
So, Hershey is far from dead on arrival. This is not to argue that Hershey has an easy time of it. Quite the contrary. But it can survive, and even thrive, even in a more competitive confectionary market. (See the Perspective, “Rare Mettle: Gold and Silver Strategies to Succeed in Hostile Markets” on StrategyStreet.com.) To do so, though, it will have to be quite astute in its choice of product benefits and in its management of its smaller-than-average cost structure.
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
Hit Them on Both Sides of the Head
One of our local newspapers is running a series on the problems of public transportation in the San Francisco Bay Area. The problem seems to be that ridership is well off of plan. The economy, and its attendant reduction in jobs and squeeze on commuter pocketbooks, has reduced demand.
Virtually all of the authorities in charge of the various modes of public transportation have found the same magic elixir for this sickness. They plan to reduce services and raise prices at the same time. Let’s see now. We find that demand is off and our answer is to reduce what people can get for their money (offer less) and to charge them more to get that “less.” How is this likely to work? This will work only if the authorities can raise the prices enough to offset the likely accelerated loss in commuter revenues that the Price increase and Performance decrease is likely to bring.
Let’s use a few simple concepts to express better what is taking place. Any business offers a Value to its customers. The Value is a combination of the Performance the business offers the customer plus the Price the business charges. The Performance includes Benefits such as Features, Reliability and Convenience of purchase. The company must beat its competition in offering this Value in order to grow market share. Right now customers are telling public transportation authorities that the current level of service for the price charged is not high enough to keep all of them using public transportation.
The business supports its Performance with its Cost Structure. The company’s Cost Structure must allow the business to make a margin on the sale of the product to the customer. Here again, the business must have a Cost Structure at least as productive as that of its competition or its margins will be lower than those of the competition. Most of these public transportation authorities are losing money. They may not be less productive than direct competitors because there are so few of those kinds of competitors. However, they are less competitive than the consumer’s alternative, perhaps even the consumer’s own automobile.
A business in a loss position has negative margins. Costs are greater than revenues. The business has two levers to pull in order to get out of this situation, other than stringent cost reduction on the current Cost Structure. First, it may raise Prices and hope that the additional revenues on the customers who stay will be greater than the revenues lost by customers who leave due to the higher price. Second, it may reduce the Performance it offers the customer as well as the costs that support that Performance. As costs come down, margins may increase, as long as customers do not defect. In extreme situations, a business may raise Prices and reduce Performance at the same time.
How extreme is this radical approach of raising Prices and reducing Performance at the same time (gutting the former Value proposition)? Over the years we have evaluated thousands of Price increases. We have found that companies are able to raise Price and reduce Performance at the same time in about 3% of the cases where Prices rise in an industry. When you see this kind of an action, you can usually assume that the industry has very strong pricing power. (See the Perspective, “Who Has Pricing Power?” on StrategyStreet.com.) For example, HP and Lexmark International launched lower capacity ink cartridges with smaller price tags to try and counter the growth of off-brand printer ink sellers. These cartridges had starting prices below $15 a cartridge but their cost per ounce of ink was higher than the predecessor products. In another case, the cable T.V. industry for years prospered by raising prices well in excess of inflation at the same time as forcing consumers to buy packages of channels, including many channels the customers did not want or ever use.
Occasionally, you also see the phenomenon of a raised Price and decreased Performance in an act of desperation to save the business. (See the Symptom & Implication, “New competition is entering a settled market” on StrategyStreet.com.) The airline industry has begun charging for previously free services, such as checking bags and serving onboard meals at the same time that its prices have gradually risen. The legacy airlines may have no choice. The difference, in this case, is that the airline industry is operating at higher levels of utilization and actually has a bit of pricing power today. Newspaper publishers have raised prices and reduced coverage in their print products to stay alive. The outlook for public transportation, and some other industries in desperate need, such as newspapers, is grim.
Virtually all of the authorities in charge of the various modes of public transportation have found the same magic elixir for this sickness. They plan to reduce services and raise prices at the same time. Let’s see now. We find that demand is off and our answer is to reduce what people can get for their money (offer less) and to charge them more to get that “less.” How is this likely to work? This will work only if the authorities can raise the prices enough to offset the likely accelerated loss in commuter revenues that the Price increase and Performance decrease is likely to bring.
Let’s use a few simple concepts to express better what is taking place. Any business offers a Value to its customers. The Value is a combination of the Performance the business offers the customer plus the Price the business charges. The Performance includes Benefits such as Features, Reliability and Convenience of purchase. The company must beat its competition in offering this Value in order to grow market share. Right now customers are telling public transportation authorities that the current level of service for the price charged is not high enough to keep all of them using public transportation.
The business supports its Performance with its Cost Structure. The company’s Cost Structure must allow the business to make a margin on the sale of the product to the customer. Here again, the business must have a Cost Structure at least as productive as that of its competition or its margins will be lower than those of the competition. Most of these public transportation authorities are losing money. They may not be less productive than direct competitors because there are so few of those kinds of competitors. However, they are less competitive than the consumer’s alternative, perhaps even the consumer’s own automobile.
A business in a loss position has negative margins. Costs are greater than revenues. The business has two levers to pull in order to get out of this situation, other than stringent cost reduction on the current Cost Structure. First, it may raise Prices and hope that the additional revenues on the customers who stay will be greater than the revenues lost by customers who leave due to the higher price. Second, it may reduce the Performance it offers the customer as well as the costs that support that Performance. As costs come down, margins may increase, as long as customers do not defect. In extreme situations, a business may raise Prices and reduce Performance at the same time.
How extreme is this radical approach of raising Prices and reducing Performance at the same time (gutting the former Value proposition)? Over the years we have evaluated thousands of Price increases. We have found that companies are able to raise Price and reduce Performance at the same time in about 3% of the cases where Prices rise in an industry. When you see this kind of an action, you can usually assume that the industry has very strong pricing power. (See the Perspective, “Who Has Pricing Power?” on StrategyStreet.com.) For example, HP and Lexmark International launched lower capacity ink cartridges with smaller price tags to try and counter the growth of off-brand printer ink sellers. These cartridges had starting prices below $15 a cartridge but their cost per ounce of ink was higher than the predecessor products. In another case, the cable T.V. industry for years prospered by raising prices well in excess of inflation at the same time as forcing consumers to buy packages of channels, including many channels the customers did not want or ever use.
Occasionally, you also see the phenomenon of a raised Price and decreased Performance in an act of desperation to save the business. (See the Symptom & Implication, “New competition is entering a settled market” on StrategyStreet.com.) The airline industry has begun charging for previously free services, such as checking bags and serving onboard meals at the same time that its prices have gradually risen. The legacy airlines may have no choice. The difference, in this case, is that the airline industry is operating at higher levels of utilization and actually has a bit of pricing power today. Newspaper publishers have raised prices and reduced coverage in their print products to stay alive. The outlook for public transportation, and some other industries in desperate need, such as newspapers, is grim.
Thursday, January 28, 2010
The Ostrich Syndrom
In 1960, the city of Chicago built McCormick Place. This facility was the first convention building built specifically to hold very large national conventions. McCormick Place put Chicago, as a convention center, on the map, where it stayed as one of the top convention destinations for the last fifty years. Now clouds gather on the horizon. Several large conventions have cancelled their Chicago venue and switched to other cities, like Las Vegas or Orlando. They site Chicago’s high cost and complex labor work rules. (See “Video #9: Overcapacity and How it Develops” on StrategyStreet.com.)
The economy has jarred the convention business in 2009. Nationally, the business was down 3%. Chicago is off by a great deal more. Its revenues have fallen 18%, while attendance at its conventions has fallen 23%. Chicago is hemorrhaging market share.
In other hostile industries, we have often found that a company gets ample warning of its deteriorating costs and price position. We see that again with McCormick Place (see “Video #3: Predicting the Direction of Margins” on StrategyStreet.com). For several years now exhibitors have been complaining about high costs and tough union work rules in Chicago. Chicago ignored them.
Now the rout is on. One big show cancelled its Chicago convention and moved to Orlando. This show annually brought 75,000 people to Chicago for its convention. This convention argues that it will save $20 million in its move to Orlando. How soon do you suppose they will reconsider Chicago?
Labor leaders in Chicago don’t see the problem as resting with them. They argue that they have lowered their hourly rates and offered greater work rule flexibility three times in the last fifteen years. But customers see it differently. (See “Video #26: Example of the Customer Buying Hierarchy at Work” on StrategyStreet.com.) You can’t argue with customers who are able to compare apples to apples. Costs are simply too high. The primary reason seems to be work rules. Those will either change or Chicago and McCormick Place will continue to lose market share.
The convention industry is one where high costs and high prices translate relatively quickly into a loss of market share. Other industries take more time. It took the domestic automobile industry nearly twenty years to lose half of its market share to less expensive foreign competitors, including foreign competitors with domestic manufacturing facilities. Neither management nor labor can force customers to subsidize costs that are higher than those of competitors. Many domestic industries have learned this lesson. How has it escaped the labor leaders at McCormick Place?
The economy has jarred the convention business in 2009. Nationally, the business was down 3%. Chicago is off by a great deal more. Its revenues have fallen 18%, while attendance at its conventions has fallen 23%. Chicago is hemorrhaging market share.
In other hostile industries, we have often found that a company gets ample warning of its deteriorating costs and price position. We see that again with McCormick Place (see “Video #3: Predicting the Direction of Margins” on StrategyStreet.com). For several years now exhibitors have been complaining about high costs and tough union work rules in Chicago. Chicago ignored them.
Now the rout is on. One big show cancelled its Chicago convention and moved to Orlando. This show annually brought 75,000 people to Chicago for its convention. This convention argues that it will save $20 million in its move to Orlando. How soon do you suppose they will reconsider Chicago?
Labor leaders in Chicago don’t see the problem as resting with them. They argue that they have lowered their hourly rates and offered greater work rule flexibility three times in the last fifteen years. But customers see it differently. (See “Video #26: Example of the Customer Buying Hierarchy at Work” on StrategyStreet.com.) You can’t argue with customers who are able to compare apples to apples. Costs are simply too high. The primary reason seems to be work rules. Those will either change or Chicago and McCormick Place will continue to lose market share.
The convention industry is one where high costs and high prices translate relatively quickly into a loss of market share. Other industries take more time. It took the domestic automobile industry nearly twenty years to lose half of its market share to less expensive foreign competitors, including foreign competitors with domestic manufacturing facilities. Neither management nor labor can force customers to subsidize costs that are higher than those of competitors. Many domestic industries have learned this lesson. How has it escaped the labor leaders at McCormick Place?
Monday, January 25, 2010
Acquisitions to Gain Product Capability
There are three primary reasons to make an acquisition. First, the acquirer may use the acquisition to reduce its cost by consolidating and reducing the total cost of overlapping cost functions. Second, the acquirer may seek to gain a new set of customers. And, third, the acquirer may be seeking a product capability which it does not have. In general, we believe that a successful acquisition will meet at least two out of these three criteria.
Recently, both Apple and Google have made important acquisitions. (See “Audio Tip #104: Where is the “Profit” in Expansion?” on StrategyStreet.com.) Both of these acquisitions have the bonus of acquiring a product capability that the company needs. Google acquired AdMob, a company which places ads on mobile web sites and applications. This is a very fast-growing market. Apple, shortly afterwards, followed suit by acquiring Quattro Wireless, a smaller competitor of AdMob. Google needs this acquisition in order to extend its advertising expertise into the mobile market. Apple needs its acquisition in order to make some revenues on the many free apps that run on its iPhones.
Which of the two companies is likely to be more successful in its acquisition? (See “Audio Tip #200: Using Acquisitions to Create Economies of Scale” on StrategyStreet.com.) Apple should certainly be able to generate revenue relatively quickly because there are so many free apps already out for the iPhone, which run on an advertising business model where the app is free to the consumer. On the other hand, Apple’s culture is hardware oriented. The company may have difficulties in dealing in a largely service-oriented market.
That won’t be Google’s problem. It already lives in the advertising world. In addition, AdMob is a much larger company than is Quattro. Google is likely to have acquired a new product capability with a lower cost structure than its Apple/Quattro Wireless competitor.
Recently, both Apple and Google have made important acquisitions. (See “Audio Tip #104: Where is the “Profit” in Expansion?” on StrategyStreet.com.) Both of these acquisitions have the bonus of acquiring a product capability that the company needs. Google acquired AdMob, a company which places ads on mobile web sites and applications. This is a very fast-growing market. Apple, shortly afterwards, followed suit by acquiring Quattro Wireless, a smaller competitor of AdMob. Google needs this acquisition in order to extend its advertising expertise into the mobile market. Apple needs its acquisition in order to make some revenues on the many free apps that run on its iPhones.
Which of the two companies is likely to be more successful in its acquisition? (See “Audio Tip #200: Using Acquisitions to Create Economies of Scale” on StrategyStreet.com.) Apple should certainly be able to generate revenue relatively quickly because there are so many free apps already out for the iPhone, which run on an advertising business model where the app is free to the consumer. On the other hand, Apple’s culture is hardware oriented. The company may have difficulties in dealing in a largely service-oriented market.
That won’t be Google’s problem. It already lives in the advertising world. In addition, AdMob is a much larger company than is Quattro. Google is likely to have acquired a new product capability with a lower cost structure than its Apple/Quattro Wireless competitor.
Monday, January 18, 2010
Price Increases in a Recession
Our recession continues, but not every industry suffers in this recession. One industry that is not suffering today is the auto rental market. The average rental rate, at an airport, for a compact car in 2009 was up over 50% from that of 2008. This, while demand in 2009 fell 20%. What accounts for this surprising result of a price rise despite a fall-off in demand? Capacity reduction. (See “Audio Tip #116: The Withdrawal of Capacity to Raise Prices” on StrategyStreet.com.)
The industry reduced its fleet size by an average of 25% in 2009. And capacity is down by 50% compared to a few years ago. This capacity reduction has given the industry power to raise its prices because the industry is running at a high rate of its fleet utilization. (See Audio Tip #101: When is Price Likely to go up in a Market?” on StrategyStreet.com.)
The industry learned to reduce its capacity in order to get pricing power in 2001. The 9/11 attack led to a steep decline in business and leisure travel. In response to that, most major auto rental companies reduced their fleet numbers. Fleet sizes dropped 20% to 25% in the industry. This gave the industry pricing power despite the fall-off in demand. For example, Hertz raised its daily rates an average of 10% and weekly rates an average of 26% during this period.
Of course, the risk is always that low-cost/low-priced competitors do not go along with the industry-wide reduction in capacity.
Not all of the industry reduced its capacity in 2009. For example, off-airport auto rental locations, many of which are the home of low-cost/low-priced auto rental competitors, saw weekly rates rise by 12% in 2009 compared to 2008. Obviously, the capacity reduction was not as great in that market. Something similar happened in 2001 when Enterprise Rent-A-Car, a low-cost competitor, announced that it would not follow the industry leader’s plans to reduce capacity.
If the industry leaders reduce capacity but low-cost competitors do not follow, the low-cost competitors will gain share (see “Audio Tip #136: Should we put our Product on Allocation” on StrategyStreet.com). Enterprise Rent-A-Car is now the largest auto rental firm in the U.S. Southwest Airlines continues to gain share against legacy airlines, who have reduced their capacity by more than has Southwest.
The industry reduced its fleet size by an average of 25% in 2009. And capacity is down by 50% compared to a few years ago. This capacity reduction has given the industry power to raise its prices because the industry is running at a high rate of its fleet utilization. (See Audio Tip #101: When is Price Likely to go up in a Market?” on StrategyStreet.com.)
The industry learned to reduce its capacity in order to get pricing power in 2001. The 9/11 attack led to a steep decline in business and leisure travel. In response to that, most major auto rental companies reduced their fleet numbers. Fleet sizes dropped 20% to 25% in the industry. This gave the industry pricing power despite the fall-off in demand. For example, Hertz raised its daily rates an average of 10% and weekly rates an average of 26% during this period.
Of course, the risk is always that low-cost/low-priced competitors do not go along with the industry-wide reduction in capacity.
Not all of the industry reduced its capacity in 2009. For example, off-airport auto rental locations, many of which are the home of low-cost/low-priced auto rental competitors, saw weekly rates rise by 12% in 2009 compared to 2008. Obviously, the capacity reduction was not as great in that market. Something similar happened in 2001 when Enterprise Rent-A-Car, a low-cost competitor, announced that it would not follow the industry leader’s plans to reduce capacity.
If the industry leaders reduce capacity but low-cost competitors do not follow, the low-cost competitors will gain share (see “Audio Tip #136: Should we put our Product on Allocation” on StrategyStreet.com). Enterprise Rent-A-Car is now the largest auto rental firm in the U.S. Southwest Airlines continues to gain share against legacy airlines, who have reduced their capacity by more than has Southwest.
Monday, January 11, 2010
A Pyrrhic Victory?
Wal-Mart stores and Costco Wholesale are disrupting markets again. The market they are disrupting today is the grocery industry. In truth, they have been disrupting the grocery industry for the last several years, to the point that Wal-Mart is now the largest grocery store company in the country. These two competitors drain their competition of their life blood by using low prices. The recession, along with the pressure applied by Wal-Mart and Costco, has reduced the consumer pricing index for food by nearly 3% over the last year.
So, what is an industry leader to do when faced with the Wal-Mart challenge? Kroger answered right away. The company reduced its prices along with those of Wal-Mart. (See “Audio Tip #180: The Real Low-Cost Competitor” on StrategyStreet.com.) The result is that Kroger expanded its market share. This growth in market share came at the expense of other industry leaders, such as Safeway and Supervalu, who did not cut their prices as deeply. (See the Symptom & Implication “As large competitors match low prices, other competitors face difficulties” on StrategyStreet.com.)
There is a rub, of course. Kroger’s margins declined in the face of the price deflation. Predictably, Wall Street pummeled Kroger’s stock.
Wall Street is wrong here. In the long term, the increase in Kroger’s size will enable it to reduce its cost structure compared to that of its smaller rivals. The easiest way to reduce a cost structure is when the company’s sales aren’t growing and you can find opportunities to improve the productivity of the cost structure by increasing efficiency and effectiveness. (See “Audio Tip #196: Why Economies of Scale Exist” on StrategyStreet.com.) It is much harder to reduce costs when the business is shrinking. In a shrinking business, company morale tends to be bad and companies almost inevitably cut muscle as well as fat.
A growing business will also allow Kroger to fine tune its value proposition in the face of the Wal-Mart price challenge. The customer buys Function, Reliability and Convenience before Price. Kroger’s ability to tailor its offerings for a broad swath of customers, and its local presence, are powerful advantages, even in the face of a competitor with lower prices. (See “Video #56: Design to Value as an Approach to Cost Management” on StrategyStreet.com.) Kroger is right.
Monday, January 4, 2010
A Concentrated Industry
Over the last few years, the exchange traded fund (ETF) business has exploded as the advantages of exchanged traded funds attract investors away from individuals picking stock or investing in mutual funds. (See "Audio Tip #1: Defining a Business” on StrategyStreet.com) The industry manages nearly three quarters of a trillion dollars in assets.
Many fast-growing industries are not highly concentrated. This industry is concentrated. The top three providers control 84% of assets under management. In the average industry, it takes about four competitors to control 84% of the industry (see Benchmarks/Market Shares on StrategyStreet.com).
The ETF industry leader, by far, is BlackRock. BlackRock recently bought the iShares operation from Barclays Global Investors. It bought a very successful business. BlackRock manages 49% of the assets invested in ETFs. This compares with the median number one player in an industry at 39% market share.
The second player in the industry is State Street Global Advisors. This company has a 23% market share. Their 23% compares with the median number two competitor in an industry with 18%.
The third player in the ETF industry is Vanguard. Vanguard owns a 12% market share. This market share is not far off from the average number three competitor in an industry, at 11%.
From the share statistics, it is clear that the unusual concentration in the ETF industry rests primarily with the top two players.
These share concentration ratios for the ETF business may fall over the next few years. New competitors are pouring in the door, offering alternative ETF vehicles. But the big changes are likely to come from Charles Schwab. Charles Schwab has begun offering ETFs with commission-free trading, in other words, lower prices.
As fast-growing industries develop, their early stages witness a predominance of Function innovations, where companies offer something new for the user of the product. As the innovations in Function begin to wane, fast-growing industries witness more price-based competition. This price-based competition then leads to a period of shake-out in the developing industry. (See “Audio Tip #34: How Does a Company “Win” in a Market?” on StrategyStreet.com.)
It looks like Charles Schwab has fired the first major shot in this price-based competition in the ETF business. It should be an interesting battle. (See the Symptom & Implication “The industry is seeing its first price wars” on StrategyStreet.com.)
Many fast-growing industries are not highly concentrated. This industry is concentrated. The top three providers control 84% of assets under management. In the average industry, it takes about four competitors to control 84% of the industry (see Benchmarks/Market Shares on StrategyStreet.com).
The ETF industry leader, by far, is BlackRock. BlackRock recently bought the iShares operation from Barclays Global Investors. It bought a very successful business. BlackRock manages 49% of the assets invested in ETFs. This compares with the median number one player in an industry at 39% market share.
The second player in the industry is State Street Global Advisors. This company has a 23% market share. Their 23% compares with the median number two competitor in an industry with 18%.
The third player in the ETF industry is Vanguard. Vanguard owns a 12% market share. This market share is not far off from the average number three competitor in an industry, at 11%.
From the share statistics, it is clear that the unusual concentration in the ETF industry rests primarily with the top two players.
These share concentration ratios for the ETF business may fall over the next few years. New competitors are pouring in the door, offering alternative ETF vehicles. But the big changes are likely to come from Charles Schwab. Charles Schwab has begun offering ETFs with commission-free trading, in other words, lower prices.
As fast-growing industries develop, their early stages witness a predominance of Function innovations, where companies offer something new for the user of the product. As the innovations in Function begin to wane, fast-growing industries witness more price-based competition. This price-based competition then leads to a period of shake-out in the developing industry. (See “Audio Tip #34: How Does a Company “Win” in a Market?” on StrategyStreet.com.)
It looks like Charles Schwab has fired the first major shot in this price-based competition in the ETF business. It should be an interesting battle. (See the Symptom & Implication “The industry is seeing its first price wars” on StrategyStreet.com.)
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